


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DOMESTIC ACTION AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY

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A Project
Presented to the
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Brigham Young University

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In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Public Administration

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by

James K. Cooke


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Sincere appreciation is extended to Dr. Robert H. Slover (Colonel, Retired) whose pride and concern for the United States Army, nurtured during thirty years as a career officer, served as the directing influence in the preparation of this project.

My thanks, too, to Colonel W. Russell Todd, Chief, Volunteer Army Office; Major Charles Folluo, Department of the Army Domestic Action Officer; and to the Domestic Action Offices at Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Devens, Massachusetts; and Fort Sam Houston, Texas. They were most generous in providing information. However, it should be noted that the interpretation of that information is my own and does not necessarily express their opinions or the views of the United States Army.

I am grateful for the support and assistance of my wife, Pat, in preparing the final text.

My regret is that time and circumstance now separate me from further involvement in this area. I feel that Domestic Action holds great potential for the moral growth of the Army and its rapprochement with the American people. I would like to have a greater part in seeing that brought to pass.

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CHAPTER I

THE MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY--PANACEA OR PROBLEM?

A TIME OF CHANGE

Richard M. Nixon has been elected President of the United States for a second term. His rallying cry calls for a generation of peace. Senator McGovern also called for peace, and felt that it could be accomplished within a reduced military posture. Although changes in our defense structure will not be as dramatic as they might have been under a President McGovern, nevertheless change is called for and change is taking place.

The right and wrong of Vietnam fills many volumes, but however one feels about it, its decade of war has belittled the American soldier. He is somehow found to be unfit because "his" war is unfit, and the will of the people has called for an end to the policy of conscription that forces a person to wear the military uniform of his country.

The United States has been directed to reach an all-volunteer status by July 1973. With revision being accomplished in outmoded traditions, and the implementation of wage scales that are reasonably competitive with the civilian sector, this goal may well be achieved. But

what then? There is concern that the termination of the draft will not take place without creating problems of its own. This concern recognizes that the draft has not only provided manpower, but has also contributed a positive effect by virtue of its civilianizing influence on the military as a result of the forced flow of personnel in and out of uniform. It is now feared that an influx of volunteers only will create a closed organization that is responsive more to its own needs than to the will of the people.

Morris Janowitz sees the trend to a closed organization developing as a result of the reduction of force that is taking place as the war winds down. He feels that a smaller army will allow a higher percentage of military families to be housed on base causing restricted social contacts with the local communities. Reduced personnel will bring pressure to transfer military personnel from the more civilian-oriented logistical positions to mission-oriented combative positions, with a resultant loss of civilian experience opportunities. Headquarters may be moved from metropolitan areas to more remote base locations. And ground fighting units, attaining an ever-increasing posture of air mobility, will find their training requirements less likely to mix with the civilian sector.¹

¹Morris Janowitz, "The Emergent Military," in Public Opinion and the Military Establishment, ed. Charles C. Moskos (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 264.

Civilian reaction to the military, as related to the Vietnam conflict, portends the possibility of a potentially more serious breach--the psychological and social polarization of the military professionals from their civilian counterparts. There has been a great frustration on the part of the professional soldier with the way that he has been required to wage war in Indo China. However, instead of receiving understanding for doing what he could in a very untenable position, he has been brought to ridicule and defamed by an editorializing press and the partisan political declarations of his civilian leaders. To be sure, war is the antithesis of a science, and since there is no "exact" way to successfully wage a war, the military man has made his share of mistakes and invited criticism, some of it justifiable. Still, there is a certain amount of hero's expectation when called on to fight, but that expectation has given way to frustration on the battlefield and rejection at home. The short-term soldier can return home and assuage his feelings by joining the critics or quietly seeking anonymity. The careerist returns home and finds himself alienated by his uniform and his determination to remain a soldier. Like the Black who clings to the ghetto because at least there are others there like him, the soldier may tend to isolate himself within the garrison because there he is accepted by his own. It has happened in foreign countries where the GI and his family tend to cling to the confines of the American enclave for social comfort and acceptance. It can also happen in the United States, and

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for parallel feelings of rejection by the society. It can lead to an increasingly self-centered military establishment predisposed to an increasing erosion of allegiance to the citizenry it is established to defend. The problem, as stated, may be overly dramatized, but if not yet significant in the reality of today, it must be considered significant in its possible consequences as we look to an all-volunteer Army.

. . . An all-volunteer force for the first time will be a professional force and the United States will have to confront an issue which it has not had to face before--how a full-time professional military fits into the larger framework of a democratic society. . . . The problem before us, then, is what kind of armed force does a modern democratic society need, and how does professional service in the Army, for officers and enlisted men, mesh with civilian life.²

ALTERNATIVES

Whenever you find a problem, you find both doctors and quacks suggesting cures. It is quackery to hold to the status quo, just as it is quackery to dismantle our defense establishment in the name of good will. However, some serious proposals have been made for ways of counter- ing the potential problems arising from an all-volunteer Army

A NATIONAL SERVICE POOL

Adam Yarmolinsky, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,

²Morris Janowitz, "Toward an all-volunteer military," The Public Interest, Spring 1972, p. 106

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suggests the possibility of a national service pool holding to the concept of the draft.

. . . If, for example, the principle of mandatory service were not only accepted but also applied beyond the military to other forms of national service, equally urgent and important for the country, the military would have the benefits of a public policy declaration in favor of a priority allocation of manpower as befits a critical public function, but it would not be identified as the sole repository of the responsibility for safeguarding the nation's security and its most sacred values.³

Mr. Yarmolinsky sees this as a share-the-man-power-wealth type of program wherein nonmilitary agencies, now operating on an all-volunteer basis, would receive a share of America's young labor. But he also sees it as a partial counter-measure to the potential of a closed military society. "General acceptance of the national service principle, on the other hand, might permit abandonment of compulsory military service without giving way to a wholly professional military, made up of career volunteers."⁴

Unfortunately, Mr. Yarmolinsky does not confront the subtleties that are present with his plan. Under the "old draft" an inductee spent his basic training wondering what his fate would be--would providence smile and send him to a nice school for advanced training, or maybe he could become a clerk or some tech service handiman. Anything, just so long as he steered clear of the train-

³Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 415.

⁴Ibid., p. 416

em-and-ship-em-out status of a rifleman. In fact, part of the anti-draft criticism expressed by Congress was that the volunteers were being given the noncombat jobs while the draftees were ending up on the front line. But would there be any less letter writing to the congressmen if the national service pool were to allocate John Jones to the Peace Corps--or an equivalent posture--while his buddy drew the military, and particularly a combatant's role? The fact that the military would be off the hook will be of little significance or consolation to the individual who feels he received the short end of the compulsory stick.

Selection based on qualification would only re-establish the problems of the present system with its inherent weakness for partiality. The middle-upper class youth with social and academic training would vie for the "apprentice ambassador" jobs while the ghetto black and Appalachian white would be fertile ground to teach how to make left and right facing movements and the assembly and disassembly of the weapon "that will save his life, if he takes care of it."

Charles C. Moskos is doubtful that any national service program can be fairly administered without some coercion, and feels that other systems may not be as equitable as the present draft law.

America's upper- and upper-middle-class youth must be willing to forsake their class privilege. Since it is virtually certain that such a step would not be self-imposed (to any large extent), any effective

national service program will necessarily require coercion to insure that all segments of the American class structure will serve. The social equivalent of military service cannot be recapitulated in a voluntary system precisely because it requires a leveling of the classes. Implementation of a regimented but egalitarian national service would put to a harsh but real test the humanistic sentiments so often voiced by today's privileged youth.

. . . If America's privileged you would really like to demonstrate their moral concern for our country's under-classes, they must be willing to put up with an extended period of indignity on par with those very same underclasses. It is only in this way that America's depressed youth will be able to participate in a social structure where there is a realistic chance to acquire a basic education, to learn a trade, to make it in a small way, to get away from a dead-end existence.⁵

However, public sentiment is not in favor of coercion as presently constituted in the draft, no matter what its redeeming social features as a "great leveler." A national service force might take some of the onus off from the military, and particularly the Army, but its administrative similarities and related weaknesses to the current draft, rule it out as a replacement for the all-volunteer Army that has been called for. Thus we are still faced with the dilemma of a pending military structure that many feel will widen rather than heal the social breach presently existing between Americans and their military force. The answer must come in a form that will allow the all-volunteer Army to be put to the test as a viable alternative to the draft, but at the same time, allow that

⁵Charles C. Moskos, "The Social Equivalent of Military Service," Teachers College Record 73 (September 1971): p. 12.

voluntary force to somehow relate itself more closely to the changing aspirations and needs of the general public.

A NATIONAL SERVICE FORCE

Dr. Albert D. Biderman, a consultant to the Department of Defense, says, "Forget about calling the military the 'armed forces.' Instead, let's create National Service Forces and redefine what are now military functions accordingly."⁶ He feels that it is time to stop thinking of the military capability in terms of capacity to inflict casualties on the enemy, to kill or wound people. In the past this capability was able to fire the patriotism and spirit of Americans, but Biderman feels that this is no longer true. Perhaps we have grown tired of hearing about body counts, of seeing the reality of death on the screens in our living rooms, or knowing that the two or twenty, or two hundred lives given in defense of a hamlet or hill will go for naught as control of the countryside seesaws back and forth. Whether it is conscience, or the lack of victory is not clear, but something has changed the will of the people, and they want something better. But what can the military give other than a military victory?

As we move toward a ceasefire peace, the soldier moves back to a regimen of "train and maintain." Simulate war, simulate casualties, simulate, simulate, and then

⁶Albert D. Biderman, "Peaceful Uses of Military Forces," Family, the Magazine of Army/Navy/Air Force/Times, 18 October 1972, p. 9

clean, repair and prepare to simulate again. The training schedule becomes the center of activity. Compliance to its repetitive requirements justifies existence, passes inspections, but saps the interest of the soldier.

Our armed forces, as with most others in the world that have engaged in warfare, have actually spent far more of their time in waiting than fighting. Garrison rather than combat is the typical military situation. Much as we like to believe that the peculiarities of military organization and practice have evolved historically to meet the demands of combat, they owe as much or more to the need to cope with this more typical situation. Ritualism and overly-rigid organization appear particularly characteristic in human affairs where a function is involved that rarely gets performed--where rehearsal must substitute for action and consummation of purpose.

As students of warfare have found, many of the habits and organization painfully developed in training camp and garrison must be wrenched into an altogether different shape when the actual challenges of combat are confronted.⁷

Biderman feels that locked within the military is a vast capability to contribute skills and effort directly to the national good. Military considerations were behind the interstate highway system. Could similar efforts directed at problems of mass transit bring similar achievements? How about efforts toward highway casualties, forest fires, ground/air/water pollution, earthquake and flood disasters? One of the nation's leading experts on coping with the effects of natural disasters is Professor J. Eugene Haas of the University of Colorado. A few years ago he was asked at a meeting of community officials, "What single thing can a community do to be better pre-

⁷Ibid., p. 14.

pared for a major disaster?" His answer: "Make sure there's a military base nearby."⁸ However, disaster relief remains an additional duty for the military. It is accomplished because the military is, by organization, equipped and staffed with the capability to assist--not because it is designed or trained to do so. In some cases its capabilities lie dormant as when World War II planes with limited capacity drop retardants on forest fires while giant Air Force bombers fly training missions.

Biderman contends that a military performing real work in a real world will, in the face of combat, actually be better prepared. "One big first step would be to have the military benefit from experience by doing real jobs in the real world for real stakes instead of spending so much time on dry runs using sham tactics against mock opponents for hypothetical objectives."⁹

In Germany U. S. medical personnel assigned to field units that are in a constant training posture, are rotated through hospitals and dispensaries since no amount of simulated training can substitute for the real thing. Maintaining enthusiasm for simulated training in the field unit becomes a superhuman effort both for the trainer and the trainee because it is recognized that there is only a remote chance that the unit will ever be called on to perform its primary mission. Occasionally there is a burst

⁸Ibid., p. 12.

⁹Ibid.

of enthusiasm when it is rumored that the unit might be called on to fly to an earthquake or flood disaster, but those instances are by far the exception rather than the rule. A reversal of policy wherein opportunities are looked for rather than waited for would add immeasurably to the response to training and the overall morale of the soldier.

Dr. Biderman sees the military as being uniquely structured toward and capable of performing social missions that could wield a strong, unifying force within the country.

The ecology movement and the peace movement, by their claims that the very future of mankind is at stake, have been able to mobilize something akin to the patriotic ethos that formerly was generated only by the Four Freedoms or "making the world safe for democracy," -- in other words, taking people beyond their personal concerns to commitment to a common cause. There is no reason why the uniformed services cannot do the same by creating a structure which serves the nation and the international community in times of crisis, whether the crises are made by man or nature, the military has an almost unique capability to create and to expand organizations through which large numbers of people can be mobilized for national service. Furthermore, it is easier to adapt the military to such goals than to create new organizations because it is the one existing institution which unabashedly, even proudly, avows a nonindividualistic ethic.¹⁰

JUST A NEW NAME, OR A NEW WAY?

It is not likely that the near future will see any wholesale restructuring of the military organization or mission on a scale like that called for in the national

¹⁰Ibid., p. 26.

service force. However, the call for increased participation in domestic actions by the military would seem to hold a real potential for providing a unification of civilian and military interests--more so than any other foreseeable course of action. It could also provide untold opportunity for much needed service to the country. For our purpose it seems to hold a realistic solution to the problem of a closed military organization that many feel will be compounded with the advent of an all-volunteer Army.¹¹

Is "The Modern Volunteer Army" going to be a new, revitalizing concept or just a new name? Changes that are taking place indicate a real intent to implement meaningful internal changes. If so, then the phrase "Today's Army Wants To Join You" may well be more than just a recruiting slogan. It infers that the Army is reaching out--but for what? Is it reaching out primarily to secure the manpower lost to it with the termination of the draft, or is there a greater perspective than this? In The Modern Volunteer Army, the Army's published

¹¹The problem of isolationism and the modern volunteer army has been pointed out by numerous writers. It is not the purpose of this paper to make an in-depth reiteration of their views, but rather to explore a possible solution to the problem. Dr. Robert H. Slover, Associate Professor of Political Science at Brigham Young University, and a retired Army Colonel, has made a more detailed analysis of the propensity for isolationism in an all-volunteer force. His summary is set forth in an unpublished paper entitled, "The Khaki Cocoon."

introduction to an all-volunteer force, it states:

The men and women who are the Army have every reason to be proud of their institution and its achievements. Over the years, the Army has proven itself equal to the many challenges it has faced; and during no period in our history have American soldiers had to meet greater demands in tough and complicated warfare than those of the recent past. As we enter new and different times, therefore, we do so with a wealth of skill, experience, and dedication.

These strengths must now be brought to bear on the vital task of improving the Army. We have reached the time for action--for bold moves, not cautious advances; for the Army must, in the national interest, remain and be recognized as a competent military force and a respected institution of our Country.

The Army's mission in this time of change remains, as ever, the defense of the Nation. But to accomplish that mission we must now, more than ever before, review and reevaluate the procedures of the past, holding nothing immune from change except the discipline, skill, and motivation which alone insure success on the battlefield. We must reinforce tradition where tradition embodies present wisdom, but more importantly, we must develop new ways where new ways are needed. In short, we must change yet stand constant, adapting to modern needs while holding to a valued code.

For the Army and for the men within it, this will be no easy task. To move into preparedness for the future will demand the full measure of energy, imagination, courage, and dedication from soldiers of every rank throughout the Army. The Nation requires it. As Army Professionals we must demand it of ourselves.¹²

There are those who would say that "demand" does not encompass the area of public domestic concern. However, if the Army is prepared for "bold moves," "in the national interest," then a more careful consideration of

¹²The Modern Volunteer Army, A Program for Professionals, (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office: 1971), pp. 3-4.

domestic action activities is not inconsistent with that forward look.

On varying scales, domestic action has been an integral part of Army history almost from its inception. Chapter II will look at that history and the impact of military-sponsored domestic actions on the public sector. Chapter III will analyze current policy as directed toward a Domestic Action Program. Chapter IV will look at current domestic action activities and the response of both military and civilian participants. And Chapter V will evaluate ways and means for a greater involvement of the all-volunteer Army in domestic action programs with the goal of creating training missions that contribute to the national welfare and, at the same time, provide a sociological "mesh" of civilian and military interests which would reverse tendencies toward isolationism on the part of the military.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL INVOLVEMENT OF THE US ARMY IN DOMESTIC ACTION PROGRAMS

EXPLORATIONS

Sacajawea (the Bird Woman), Lewis and Clark, the exploration of the Missouri, the Snake and the Columbia Rivers--few would identify these romantic names in American history with the United States Army. Yet, these names and events marked the early history of the army's involvement in domestic action programs.

The Lewis and Clark Expedition of 1804-06 was, in fact, a military expedition organized under the direction of President Jefferson and sent out by the War Department. "Officially, it was a detachment of the regular army composed of officers and privates sworn in for a special service."¹ The command was shared by Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, both commissioned army officers.

A civilian expedition similarly equipped with guides and translators may well have achieved the same outstanding results in blazing the trail from the Mississippi to the Pacific. However, the point is not so much that the Army

¹New Standard Encyclopedia, 1955 ed., s.v. "Pike, Zebulon Montgomery."

did it, but moreso, that the government was able to use the army in a domestic mission related to its military capabilities. The training and experience obtained by the soldiers was extraordinary; the contribution made to the country was monumental. It was a procedure that was to be repeated.

Zebulon Pike joined his father's regiment when he was only fifteen. Eleven years later he had advanced to First Lieutenant and was called on to further the exploration of the Louisiana Purchase.

. . . The twenty-six-year-old stripling began his discoveries in the fall of 1805 when he started northward from St. Louis with a well-stocked keelboat and twenty (enlisted) men. Stopping at the Falls of St. Anthony to purchase land for a government post and build a light barge, the party moved on to Little Falls where a small stockade was constructed for winter quarters. While most of the men settled down in cozy comfort, Pike and twelve companions pressed forward on sledges through the snow-blanketed Minnesota countryside. Here and there they found posts of the Northwest Company proudly flaunting the Union Jack, all occupied by cheerful Canadian traders who entertained the Americans royally and swore solemnly to display the Stars and Stripes in the future, knowing full well no one could punish them if they did not. At Leech Lake, which Pike falsely took to be the source of the Mississippi, the explorers started southward, reaching Little Falls on March 5. By the end of April, 1806, they were back in St. Louis.²

Lieutenant Pike was anything but modest when he reported his accomplishments and by July 1806 he and a detachment of twenty-three enlisted men were again on the move. This time his trail led south to the Arkansas River and on to the Rockies where a fort was erected on the

² Ray Allen Billington, Westward Expansion (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1959), pp. 450-451.

present site of Pueblo. This post was used as a base while they made a two month exploration of the Colorado country, and an unsuccessful bid to climb the peak that now bears his name. He and his men were later arrested when they "wandered" onto Spanish soil. All of Pike's notes and maps were taken away, but he managed to remember considerable detail and submitted a report which brought him wide acclaim.

Other army officers and their men were to open new trails. Major Stephen H. Long was sent out by the Secretary of War in 1823 to explore the Northwest from Fort Payne to the northern boundary of Lake Superior. The first reasonably accurate maps of the region west of the Rocky Mountains were compiled by Captain Benjamin de Louis Eulalie de Bonneville during the years 1832 to 1835. Lieutenant Philip St. George Cooke is credited with explorations in 1846 and 1847 which opened the southern route from Santa Fe to San Diego.

John C. Fremont was a United States Army Officer in the corps of topographical engineers. In that capacity he made a number of trips into the then unknown regions of the Rocky Mountains, and "crossed the continent no less than five times, discovering the passes now traversed by railways and noting sites desirable for military posts. In 1844-45 he explored the region of Utah. In 1846 he cooperated with Commodore Stockton in the conquest of California. In 1848 he explored a route from Santa Fe to Sacramento. These various expeditions made him famous as

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'The Pathfinder.' His name has been perpetuated in various cities and counties of the West."³

It is appropriate to note that the Army was in a unique position of advantage during this exploratory period. Until 1849 and the organization of the Department of Interior, the President's cabinet contained the heads of only five departments; State, Treasury, War, Justice and the Post Office. Jefferson and subsequent presidents of that time had little choice but to turn to the War Department for men and materiel to carry out these programs of internal domestic development. That the programs were dangerous and required disciplined units of personnel made the Army a logical choice.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FRONTIER COMMUNITY

Movies and television have typed the soldier of America's westward movement as essentially a backward, brazen Indian fighter, often overlooking his broad participation in and contribution to the immigrant society that sprung up around the military post. Soldiers were often teachers, and the better caliber of schools at the forts tended to promote improvements in schooling in surrounding civilian communities. Church parishes were built around the ministerings of military chaplains. The garrison guardhouse was often the first county jail. Army physicians provided medical care to military, civilians

³New Standard Encyclopedia, "Fremont."

and to Indians. Some musical and theatrical groups which function today can find their beginning in the frontier military community. The academic culture of the military academy was carried westward with the army, and "to a considerable extent, therefore, army officers conditioned the intellectual climate of the frontier."⁴

THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS: A CIVILIAN ORIENTATION

The Army Corps of Engineers has been so involved in domestic action programs that some are prone to regard it as a civilian agency. "The Corps has had responsibility for internal navigation and flood control since 1816; the General Survey Act of 1824 specifically authorized the use of the Army Engineers; in 1825 soldiers built the so-called 'Chicago Road' across southern Michigan; they also were involved (well into the twentieth century) in building the road, rail and communications system of Alaska; and between 1815 and the 1860s army officers were frequently loaned to state governments and to private railroad companies."⁵ Even during the Civil War President Lincoln withdrew General Grenville M. Dodge from Grant's army to work with the Union Pacific Railroad in building a branch line.

After several failures in attempts to cut a sea-lane across the Isthmus of Panama, Major General George

⁴Edward Bernard Glick, Peaceful Conflict (Harrisburg, Pa: Stackpole Books, 1967), p. 54.

⁵Ibid., p. 47.

Washington Goethals, Corps of Engineers was appointed chairman of a predominantly military commission to complete the canal. President Theodore Roosevelt is said to have remarked: "The great thing about an Army officer is that he does what you tell him to do."⁶

The Army Medical Service came in for a share of the success through the work of Major William C. Gorgas and Major Walter Reed in the control of malaria and yellow fever, a contribution of vital importance in the completion of the canal, and one of lasting benefit to the country.

In other areas, many tourists in the nation's capital would be surprised to find that the Corps of Engineers supervised or actually constructed the Washington Monument, the State Department, War Department, Navy and Post Office buildings, and the Pentagon.

THE FIRST WEATHERMEN

In 1870 the War Department was authorized to provide meteorological observations at military posts and within the interior of the country, and to provide storm warnings along the coasts and Great Lakes region. The War Department assigned this task to the Army Signal Service. On November 1, 1870, 24 sergeants located throughout the nation filed telegraphic reports giving the first broad-based, consolidated weather report. Within a year coverage had been extended to the Pacific coast and Canada.

⁶Ibid., p. 48.

In 1891 this mission was transferred to the Department of Agriculture.⁷

THE ARMY'S LARGEST DOMESTIC ACTION PROGRAM

The largest nonmilitary program in terms of personnel involved to be undertaken by the Army was its work with the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). The CCC was established by Act of Congress at the request of President Roosevelt on 31 March 1933. The bill authorized the President,

under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe and by utilizing such existing departments or agencies as he may designate, to provide for giving work to unemployed citizens, without regard to race, color or creed, in the construction, maintenance and carrying on of works of public nature in connection with the forestation of land belonging to the United States or to the several states.

The primary objectives of the CCC were to "give jobs to discouraged and undernourished young men; to build up these men physically and spiritually; and, to start the nation on a good conservation program."

Initially, the War Department was expected only to receive the men and process them into units. It was soon realized that without more complete involvement by the Army it would be difficult to administer the camps. Thus the Army's role extended to the areas of supply administration, sanitation, medical care, hospitalization and welfare. In Essence, the Army became responsible for all aspects of

⁷Phillip R. Smith, Jr., "Army Weather Pioneers," Army Digest, Vol. 25, No. 2 (February 1970), pp. 59-61.

the program except for initial enrollment of personnel and the selection and supervision of the work projects.

From all indications, the U.S. Army did not initially anticipate the broad role it ultimately assumed nor the rapid acceleration that occurred. It has been pointed out that the Army met its goals only by diverting a large proportion of its efforts and strength to the CCC with negative efforts on its normal training and readiness. For example, in order to provide enough regular Army officers, about three thousand early graduations from service schools were required and a large number of personnel were withdrawn from all kinds of normal duties. Normal duties took a second place and priority was given to the CCC program.

It has been emphasized that the CCC was characterized initially by its large size and the rapidity with which the President wanted the program to proceed. These two aspects, unexpected size and rapidity of execution, presented the Army with a mission similar to mobilization for an unexpected war. Most writers seem to indicate the Army did its job well, but suffered initially because its primary mission capability was reduced. General MacArthur stated that the lack of officers "brought Regular Army Training in the Continental United States to a virtual standstill, and has almost destroyed the readiness of units for immediate and effective employment or emergency duty." He is said to have indicated, "I want my officers to be brought out of the woods and back to duty." This condition changed

later, however, as regular officers were replaced with reserve officers.

The CCC program was seen to have some positive effects on the military, one of these being that many reserve officers received training from their involvement and the fact that the CCC gave nonmilitary but disciplined training to many men who later served in World War II.

RECENT HISTORY

Early in 1965 the Army conducted Exercise Polar Strike in Alaska as training for its Special Forces. In joint consultation with the United States Public Health Service and the Alaska Department of Health and Welfare, it was decided that the army personnel would engage in:

1. Teaching natives basic first-aid procedures, and giving general hygiene and nutritional instruction based on current publications furnished by the USPHS.
2. Advising the village council, through the village Health Aide, concerning sanitation methods and techniques.
3. Teaching, advising, and helping village Health Aides in patient care.
4. Rendering medical and dental care within the capability of the detachment medics and the Civic Action Team.
5. Consulting USPHS area physicians and dentists concerning patient management.⁸

The program was carried out by teams visiting selected villages to dispense medical, dental and veterinary assistance. Each team worked through the respective

⁸Glick, Peaceful Conflict, p. 60.

Village Council and every effort was made to train local personnel in self-help programs. In some of the island villages it had been more than two and a half years since a professional dentist had made a visit.

. . . In Tetlin the dentist extracted 50 teeth, made 53 restorations, and did 35 cleanings. In Shishmaref all of the 230 inhabitants were examined and 4 sent to hospitals on the mainland. There were 126 dental extractions, 80 cleanings and fluoride treatments, 12 restorations, and 889 inoculations of dogs against rabies. Nearly 100 percent of Savoonga's 397 people were given medical and dental examinations, and all of the children had their teeth cleaned and were given topical fluoride applications. There were 76 restorations and 326 extractions, a rather high average of 4 extractions per school child. And as for Savoonga's dog population, 120 of them were inoculated against rabies.⁹

The entire project was exceptionally well received and brought considerable laudatory comment from all levels of the Alaskan community.

The army's historical involvement in domestic actions has been productive, both for the army and the country, but past successes are not necessarily today's remedies. Can domestic actions provide the jell needed to unite civilian and military interests?

⁹Ibid., p. 60.

CHAPTER III

DOMESTIC ACTION POLICY--PRO AND CON

The United States Army is maintaining an active participation in domestic actions. Its policy calls for it, but to what extent? In this chapter we shall attempt to explore that policy to see what it says, and analyze what it really means.

AN OLD CONCEPT NEWLY ORGANIZED

Although the Army's participation in domestic actions dates back to the beginnings of American history, the Department of Defense Domestic Action Program was formalized only as recently as April 1969 by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. Within that program Domestic Action activities are defined as ". . . that aggregation of efforts, programs, and projects within the Department (of Defense) which contribute to the constructive development of our society. As such it includes individual, unit, Service, and defense-wide activities that help alleviate local, regional, and national social problems."¹

The program is directed by a DoD Domestic Action

¹U.S., Department of Defense, Domestic Action, Information Guidance Series, no. 8G-1 Revised (August 1972), p. 2.

Council, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, which is charged with the responsibility of coordinating the Domestic Action Program of the Military Departments and major Defense Agencies.² The general policies of the program are outlined in Department of Defense Directive Number 5030.37: Support of the Domestic Action Program. It calls for emphasis in the areas of (1) Equal Opportunity, (2) Manpower, (3) Procurement, (4) Resources, (5) Community Relations, and (6) Transfer of Technical Knowledge. Those six areas are spelled out in Army Regulation 28-19: Department of the Army Support of the Domestic Action Program. The Army regulation follows the precise policy of the DoD Directive but orients the wording to meet Army structure, as follows:

Equal Opportunity. Domestic actions will be undertaken in a manner which assures that equal opportunity and treatment are afforded all military members, civilian employees of the Department of the Army, and the public sector irrespective of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Manpower. The greatest resource of the Department of the Army is personnel, both military and civilian. Commanders are encouraged to commit their commands' energies to the Domestic Action Program. Individuals should be encouraged to volunteer their services during off-duty

²Ibid., p. 1.

hours.

Procurement. Where possible, current policies of providing assistance to areas of concentrated unemployment and underemployment, by setting aside portions of contracts for companies located in these areas, should continue to be emphasized.

Resources. The physical resources of the Department of the Army (equipment, facilities, services, property, etc.) should be used to the maximum extent practicable in support of domestic actions when not employed in their primary defense mission. The use of these resources should be on a reimbursable basis wherever it is feasible to do so, and whenever legally required.

Community Relations. Activities which focus on social and economic problems are considered domestic actions.

Transfer of technical knowledge. Often in the course of performing traditional Department of the Army tasks, know-how is acquired and results are obtained that could benefit other Government agencies as well as the private sector. It is the intent of the Department of Defense that unclassified technical information be made available to the public whenever and wherever possible consistent with the provisions of applicable regulations.³

³U.S., Department of the Army, Department of the Army Support of the Domestic Action Program, Army Regulation 28-19 w/C1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 15 July 1971), pp. 1-1 and 1-2.

LIMITED HORIZONS

One cannot help but be impressed by the scope of activities covered in the program. The challenge and opportunity it presents in creating a highly positive "mesh" with the civilian community is almost unlimited. Yet, the Domestic Action Program is not a required activity and functions largely on a piece-meal basis, particularly in comparison with its potential.

Within the general constraints controlling its activities, The Department of Defense cannot act as the initiator, rather its role is to stand by and assist:

Department of Defense funds cannot be used in support of Domestic Action activities.

Military installations may engage in Domestic Action projects which do not affect the primary mission of the unit involved.

Each project must be initiated, planned and operated by the local community; that is, a community interested in a cooperative project must make the approach, and be ready to assume the burden of continuity.⁴

The DoD directive does much to direct perspective, but it can do little to direct action, and there is no overt attempt to designate domestic actions as a fundamental requirement for the Military Services. The directive simply states that ". . . Components will establish procedures for implementation of internal domestic action activities."⁵

⁴DoD, Domestic Action, p. 2.

⁵U.S., Department of Defense, DoD Support of the Domestic Action Program, DoD Directive 5030.37 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 22 April 1971) p. 8.

The same passive tone carries over to the Army regulation wherein commanders "are encouraged" to establish Community/Domestic Action Councils at the local level, who will develop the installation or unit programs.⁶ Local programs also function within well-defined constraints. As already noted, "Commanders are encouraged to commit their commands' energies to the Domestic Action Program," but on a voluntary, off-duty basis. Domestic actions may be performed in conjunction with unit/individual training, but under the following conditions:

(1) Units/individuals are authorized, when requested and approved by appropriate military and civil authority, to advise, assist, and support local, State and other Federal agencies in planning, developing, coordinating and implementing domestic actions.

(2) Unit participation is authorized when--

(a) Appropriate training is derived for the entire unit and such training contributes to the readiness mission;

(b) No Army funds are expended other than those programed and utilized for the training mission; and

(c) Domestic action projects are within the capability of that unit to perform.

(3) Elements of a unit may participate when--

(a) They represent an organized group that would typically train together;

(b) Training contributes to the proficiency of all group members; and

(c) No Army funds are expended other than those programed and utilized for that phase of training.⁷

⁶AR 28-19, DA Support, p. 1-3.

⁷Ibid.

The overriding factor in Army policy is that domestic action activities will in no way interfere with the unit mission.⁸ In the tradition of military preparedness this is a paramount consideration. But if there is value in a closer working relationship between the military and civilian sectors, then an adaptation of the military mission to domestic needs might well be considered.

ORGANIZED AS DIRECTED

Because of the low key "requirements" approach of the DoD and DA directives, one will not find a well-defined organization directing the Domestic Action Program. One officer in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) coordinates the Department of the Army program. He explains that Domestic Actions is essentially a "bottom up" program. That is, units at the ground level respond voluntarily with little, if any, centralized direction or coordination from Department of the Army level.⁹ The DA Domestic Action Officer consolidates the reports of subordinate units in a Semi-annual Domestic Action Activity Report, but this, too, is on a voluntary basis. The numerical and narrative data is

⁸A condensed version of the Army policy line is carried in the Fact Sheet, Subject: Army Support of Department of Defense Domestic Action Programs, which is reproduced as Appendix A.

⁹Information received in phone conversation with Major Charles Folluo, Department of the Army Domestic Action Officer.

forwarded on to the Department of Defense, but there is no Army level provision for action analysis. Consolidated reports are also sent back to participating subordinate commands, but for information purposes only.

In subordinate commands the position of Domestic Action Officer is normally identified as an additional duty, and officers filling that position can be found in the Information Office, the G1, G5, or Adjutant's office. There is no clear-cut chain of action because none is required. It is strictly a voluntary program and posts are not required to even have a domestic action officer.

A notable exception to this voluntary philosophy is found at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The regulation directing their Domestic Action Program states, "While voluntary participation is to be encouraged, it must be emphasized that a program of this importance cannot always be accomplished on a purely voluntary basis. In this connection, projects should be tied to the training objectives of the command whenever possible. Often, this may be the only way in which military participation can be justified."¹⁰ Because of its detailed and aggressive approach to Domestic Action, this regulation has been included as Appendix B.

¹⁰U.S., Department of the Army, Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Domestic Action, Regulation 525-4 (Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 22 April 1972), para. 6b.

POLICY AND POLICY-MAKERS

Blame for the Army's reticence to move in the area of domestic actions cannot be placed on its regulations alone. Directives are the written expression of those in a position to influence or dictate what the Army's policy will be. The lack of firm wording in the regulation would indicate a less than positive outlook on the part of those policy makers both within and without the military.

Many of the historical examples cited in Chapter II occurred because the civilian sector lacked either the expertise and/or the executive agencies to perform the job. This is no longer the case, and some would now militate for a reduction of direct military involvement in the domestic sector. Secretary of the Interior Hickel recommended that the civil functions of the Corps of Engineers be placed under the Interior. He believed that putting civil works under his Department would facilitate a coordinated approach to protecting the nation's natural environment. It was not the first time that this transfer had been proposed as several Interior Secretaries before him had made similar proposals. Corps leaders opposed the recommendation contending it would further complicate the tangled bureaucracy of the Interior Department and indicated a better case could be made for putting parts of Interior under the Corps. The Washington Post joined in the call for a transfer of the civil functions of the Corps to the Interior for the sake of a "restoration of

a healthful environment," but their well-intentioned act was taken as another attack on the structural integrity of the Army.¹¹

LTC Arthur J. Leary, Jr. sought to gain an insight into current feelings of officers with respect to Army participation in domestic actions by questioning his class of 1970 at the Army War College. He recognized that many of the student officers would be assigned to command and staff positions within headquarters at Department of the Army and throughout the continental United States, and would be involved in further implementation of domestic action programs. A questionnaire was distributed and responses were received from 146 of the 184 officers in the class.

Although aware of Mr. Laird's and Mr. Resor's directives and announcements concerning civic action, and the Army's current involvement in programs such as the President's Youth Programs, 53% of the officers replied in the negative to the question, "Do you feel that the Army should be involved at all in domestic action programs?" The key words in this question were "at all". If the Army were to become more heavily committed than it presently is, or the forecast size of the Army is to be smaller than it presently is, undoubtedly the percentage expressing an adverse feeling would have been higher.¹²

This type of response is indicative of the conviction, particularly among senior career officers, that

¹¹LTC Arthur J. Leary, Jr., "The Role of the US Army in Nation Building--Our Own." Student thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 6 March 1970, p. 25.

¹²Ibid., p. 22.

the Army's prime, and many feel only, mission should be the preparation for and waging of combat against a hostile enemy. That concept is so ingrained that it will appreciably reduce, if not totally negate, "voluntary" initiative by some commanders in the direction of domestic actions.

LTC Leary also noted a civilian expression of dissent by Amitai Etzioni, a member of the Bureau of Social Research, Washington, D.C., as appeared in an article, "Can the Military Aid the Home Front?"

. . . there is good reason to hold that it would be just as well if the DoD did not become a major domestic factor. In countries where the military has become (with US help) the center for handling of domestic problems . . . the following effects have been observed . . . a deepening identification with the military as a source of organization and competence, while the civilian sector is viewed as run by ineffectual, corrupt politicians . . . If the military has idle resources they should be turned over to civilians, either by releasing or lending them, and not used to justify the creation of new, non-military missions for the armed forces. The military is too powerful as it is, and would grow more so should it become our domestic savior.¹³

It is reactions of that type which breeds reciprocal "who needs them" distrust between the civilian and military. Yet, where domestic actions are being carried out, significant changes for the better are taking place in the attitudes of both military and civilian personnel involved.

¹³Ibid., pp. 22-23.

CHAPTER IV

CURRENT DOMESTIC ACTIONS AND REACTIONS

We have talked in terms of history, and of theory that would require some revision of present Army missions and training concepts. However, even under the limitations of the present voluntary program there are major developments taking place in the area of domestic actions, and many programs have already had a positive impact on the civilian sector.

MAST

One of the more unique programs is MAST--Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic. Military helicopters and pilots and corpsmen are used to aid civilian authorities in the rapid transportation of traffic accident victims and other medical emergency patients to hospitals when the critical need for immediate hospital treatment and facilities may mean the difference between life and death.

Injuries confronting the flight medics range from kidney shutdown and cardiac problems to all types of fractures and cuts, as well as shock associated with traumatic injuries. These medics are called upon to suction airways, administer intravenous fluids, and apply bandages, while

constantly monitoring heart beats, respiration and blood pressure.¹

A Texas doctor who saw his son-in-law saved from death by a rapid MAST evacuation from an auto scene, had this to say, "I hate to admit it now, but prior to the accident I had very little use for the military. I would think of the Army and all I could see was killing. That one night changed me. The Army is saving lives and doing it right here in the States. What greater peacetime mission can there be for the military?"²

A small Texas town held a huge barbecue for all of the members of an air ambulance unit which had transported several of the town's children to larger hospitals. An old crew chief said, "It really made us feel great. We used to do nothing but bore holes in the sky, and now we're doing something to help the people who really need it. These people can't afford to throw a spread like that, but they wanted to do it just to say thanks."³

One MAST project officer was concerned because things were going too smoothly. "Anytime the military gets involved with the civilian sector, we've come to

¹Office of the Information Officer, "Press Release," Fort Sam Houston, Texas, September 12, 1972.

²Andrew Schneider, "Dust Off Dividend," Army/Navy/Air Force Times, 18 October 1972, found in the bi-weekly FAMILY supplement, p. 10.

³Ibid.

expect a fair amount of static. When we started MAST we expected smoke from everyone from the American Helicopter Association to the AMA. It's been two years now and all we've gotten is praise. We must be doing something right."⁴

Perhaps the thing that's making the road so smooth is the careful and thorough planning needed prior to a new MAST site's activation. An example of this is a meeting held February 28 at Fort Jackson, S.C.

Attending the meeting were members of more than 20 groups interested in obtaining MAST for a state-wide program. They included South Carolina State and local police, hospital officials, assorted rescue and medical groups, local military and committee.

The meeting had been the idea of the director of South Carolina's highway safety program, Brig. Gen. Roland Barnick (USAF, Ret.). Working through the governor's office, Barnick had requested the commander of Fort Jackson, Maj. Gen. William Coleman, to set up the meeting.

The MAST committee had been averaging about 16 of these meetings each month at various places in the country. Each of the members smoothly presented his part of the story of MAST, its background, problems, advantages and limitations. They then covered what obligations the state would have to fulfill before the project could be started. The main prerequisites were that each of the 12 large hospitals and the 30 rural medical centers in the state would have to provide some method of communications between the hospitals and the service rescue units, and a simple "heli-stop" (a flat area with a wind sock) for helicopter landings.

The remainder of the morning was spent discussing the medical-legal aspects, the best methods of involving the smaller communities, and countless other topics. A member of the governor's staff summed up the morning by saying, "Most of us came to the meeting with a lot of questions and some doubts. When we left a few hours later, the doubts were gone, and we felt we had started a damn good program that would save a hell of a lot of lives."⁵

⁴Ibid., p. 11.

⁵Ibid., pp. 11 & 30. (This excellent article by Mr. Schneider is repeated in its entirety in Appendix C.)

Undoubtedly there were persons on both the military and civilian sides who were hesitant, if not opposed to creating a joint program, but MAST showed that a union of the two sides could provide a very real contribution to society as a whole.

CENTER

A small agricultural community in south central Colorado has also been touched by the Army's Domestic Action Program. From the air Center "looks like a grid of low adobe structures plopped amid yellow and green farm fields running up to the mountains. Up close, the Chicano sections are slums: abandoned cars in the alleys, wood piles to burn for heat, outside privies, no running water. Some children get sick on the poisoned water coming from backyard surface wells. The residents, living off widely spaced harvest checks, cannot afford to pay for either paved streets or running water. The surrounding beauty of the Colorado countryside mocks the pain of many of the people here."⁶

The problems of this town and its 60 percent Chicano population came to the attention of the Army when the director of the federal government's Head Start Program in Central asked the Army to truck in some surplus government equipment.

Maj. Gen. John C. Bennett, commander of Ft. Carson, told a local citizens group that the Army could do

⁶George C. Wilson and Haynes Johnson, "Civic Action: Army's New Battlefield," The Washington Post, 19 September 1971, p. A1.

more, much of the work Center needs to have done would provide useful training for the soldiers, he said. Bennett stressed that the Army could provide only the manpower and equipment, not the money or material. Also, he said, the town itself must decide what it wanted from the Army. And it would have to submit a request.

. . . the town realized it had to organize itself to obtain benefits from the Army. This gave birth to the Planning Commission where, as the citizens tell it, for the first time in years "Anglos" and Chicanos sat around the same table and jointly decided what Center needed most that the Army could provide.⁷

This project saw the Army assist in multiple projects throughout the town including renovations, street paving, water and sewer projects, and the erection of a new town jail. Secretary of the Army Robert F. Froehlke visited the town and commented most favorably upon what he saw.

The beauty of domestic action, Froehlke says, is that the soldier can perform the training they would have to undergo anyhow and yet they can do it where they can see positive results.

The young people in today's Army, the secretary says, "are far more idealistic, far better motivated than my contemporaries back in World War II. They want to feel as though they're contributing to the overall good.

"Now, if we can explain the peace-keeping mission of the Army, that's one step toward convincing young Americans that the Army is not just a war machine. It's a machine prepared to wage war in order to keep the peace. Now that is not just semantics; that's vital if we're going to get these young people in the Army."

Froehlke--who only took office on July 1 (1971)--concedes that public relations considerations are part of the appeal of domestic action. Such projects explain "to the public generally that we have

⁷Ibid., p. A14.

human beings in the Army that have the same human motivation, the same desires as anybody else. And they want to help a guy who is down and out, a community that is down and out."⁸

There were sentiments on the other side. A local dentist expressed some resentment because "he feared the people would come to lean on the Army as the Eskimos relied on the white traders, only to be abandoned."⁹ That sensitivity is backed by some military concern about getting into community action programs. Brig. Gen. Robert G. Gard, Jr., for one, wrote in the magazine Foreign Affairs that "it would be wrong to use military units to engage in civic action projects in American cities, for this would thrust the armed services into sensitive activities for which they are unqualified. Poor performance in these projects, or even controversy over selection of priorities, could lead to further resentment of the military establishment."¹⁰ This remark could be laid to well-intentioned concern for the military, but it also places a questionable limitation on the adaptability of the Army as well as the responsiveness of the civilian community. A controversy over priorities developed in Central which carried clear to the White House. The Army simply waited it out until the Planning Commission resolved the matter, and then

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

resumed work with the press giving only favorable comment to the overall part the Army played in the projects. Press releases on the Center project have been included as Appendix D.

PROJECT NATION-BUILDING

While Commanding General at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, LTG John J. Tolson II came up with the notion of using the special skills displayed by the Green Berets. He felt that if civic action teams in Vietnam could combat sores, human parasites, rats, venereal diseases and other miseries, they could do the same thing better at home, and make it a part of their regular training.

Two counties immediately south of Fort Bragg were selected for their high rate of poverty and rural isolation. Hoke County had only two doctors for 16,436 people compared with a national average of 1 to 650. There was one dentist and a tuberculosis rate four times higher than the state average. Half of the residents were either black or Lumbee Indians. Anson County, 60 miles to the west, was only slightly better off medically. The infusion of medical teams into these two counties was nick-named Project Nation-Building.

. . . Among the first nation menders into Hoke County were a doctor, Captain George Reavell, and five medics, including Green Beret Master Sergeant Jesse Black, a career soldier with 19 years in the service, including four in Viet Nam. The ground rules were strict: the medics are so highly trained that they can perform amputations. All medical equipment was supplied by state, local and private agencies.

While the other medics usually remain in the health center assisting Reavell and the clinic's one county-supplied nurse, Black roams the back country roads as a "point man," watching for tell-tale signs of sickness, lecturing families on how to guard against hookworm, which afflicts some 30% of Hoke's children, and distributing health pamphlets. "I am a rat, I am your enemy, I carry germs that make people sick," begins one. There are others on prenatal care, family planning and hygiene.

When he returns, Black discusses the cases he has seen with Reavell, who then decides whether treatment seems warranted. Reavell is the spark plug of the health center program. His practice runs the gamut of public health care--TB skin tests, immunizations, pre-school exams, impetigo, cuts, prenatal care, venereal disease, chest X rays and family planning.

Socialized Medicine? Like their counterparts in Hoke, the two medics in Anson County do not prescribe drugs, but assist the nurses in whatever needs to be done--blood tests, immunizations, urinalyses, paper work. The remaining twelve members of the unit work at a variety of different tasks, clearing out clogged, mosquito-infested ditches, repairing dilapidated public buildings and teaching gym classes in the local schools.

Response to the Green Berets in Hoke and Anson has been more than favorable; to the residents and their hard-pressed medical and school personnel, the military presence has been wholly benevolent. Says Dr. Riley Jordan, one of Hoke's two private physicians: "They are serving a tremendous local need. A lot of people are being seen who wouldn't otherwise be seen."

The success of the projects has also converted some reluctant Berets. One was Lieut. Colonel Bill Robinson, a tough man who was operations officer for the Son Tay prison-camp raid into North Viet Nam. He admits that he was dead set against turning his troopers into community helpers, but has come around to see that "with this civic action thing, we're just using our talents in a different way."¹¹

This program has since been expanded to other states including a team sent to the Tongue River Indian

¹¹ Ibid.

Reservation, home of the Northern Cheyenne, in Montana.

More detailed accounts of domestic action projects could be cited from active posts such as Fort Benning, Fort Bragg, Fort Carson, Fort Devens, and Fort Sam Houston, but it is also important to look at what might be a more representative cross-sampling of activities by units within each of the major CONUS commands. The following extracts were selected at random from each of the Annexes contained in the Semi-annual Domestic Action Activity Report for the period 16 September 1971 to 15 March 1972.

ANNEX A - First US Army (page 2)

a. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. (1) Served as host for overnight and weekend visits of Boy Scout units from Pennsylvania and surrounding states.

(2) Sponsored Girl Scout Week program commemorating Sixtieth Anniversary, Girl Scouts of the United States. Troop from surrounding communities were invited to participate in activities consisting of social events, and a special "World Friendship Day Program."

(3) Plans were developed to host a Jim Thorpe Junior Olympics, Ecology ("Stash the Trash") program, and summer recreational program for youth in neighboring civilian communities.

b. Fort Devens, Massachusetts. (1) The 10th Special Forces Group conducted Mountain Training and Safety Classes for the Nashua Valley Boy Scouts on the following dates: 23 September, 2, 12 and 21 October 1971 with a total of 85 participants.

(2) The 10th Special Forces Group conducted a Winter Survival Class for scout masters and advisors of the Nashua Valley Council on 11 January 1972 with a total of 105 participants.

(3) The 10th Special Forces Group conducted Survival Classes for Boy Scouts in the Nashua Valley

Council Area and Manchester, New Hampshire, on 19, 23 and 25 January 1972 with a total of 105 participants.

(4) The 10th Special Forces Group conducted a Survival Class for 48 Boy Scouts in Groton, Ma, on 21 February 1972.

(5) The 100th S&S Battalion loaned a water trailer to 45 Boy Scouts from Peperell, Ma, from 5 through 8 November 1971.

ANNEX B - Third US Army (page 39)

3. 931st Engineer Brigade Activities (Fort Benning, Georgia)

The projects accomplished by the 931st Engineer Group included supplying surveyors to assist the 197th Infantry Brigade in surveying and locating a recreational facility in Montgomery, Alabama. The surveyors reported to the 197th Infantry Brigade on 27 September 1971 and worked until 1 October 1971. The project included laying foundations for two buildings and repairing existing buildings for a Boy Scout Camp.

The unit organized and sponsored a Boy Scout Canoe-A-Thon that involved almost one hundred Boy Scouts who paddled canoes for three days from Fort Benning, Georgia to Lake Eufaula, Georgia. The 931st Engineer Group provided all logistical support, coordination, and control. An athletic field for two little league baseball fields was constructed with engineer equipment near the Columbus Municipal Airport. The athletic field will be used by youth and adults who live in, and visit in Columbus.

The Annual Cub Scout Pow-Wow was organized and sponsored by this unit and held on Fort Benning in Building 4. The Pow-Wow is a program to educate scout leaders to be better administrators and managers. Class rooms were organized and booths constructed, pamphlets published and the program was coordinated by this headquarters.

A Cub Scout Derby Race was shown as a demonstration to boys of Cub Scout age in schools in the Columbus area. The demonstration program lasted for almost two months and included most of the local grade schools.

Surveys and plans for a recreational area at Belevedere Part, in Columbus, Georgia, were completed.

ANNEX C - Fifth US Army (page 101)

5. USA Medical Department Activities Support.
(Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri)

a. The General Leonard Wood Army Hospital provided medical care on an emergency basis, to 117 civilians on an out-patient basis, and 32 civilians on an in-patient basis.

b. One unit of blood was provided to Pulaski County Hospital, Waynesville, Missouri on 6 December 1971, and three units of blood were provided to the Salem Memorial Hospital, Salem, Missouri on 7 March 1972.

c. During the period 1-10 December 1971, four optometrists examined the eyes of 1400 local elementary and junior high school students.

d. Eleven dentists prepared 274 protective mouth guards for local high school and junior high school students during the month of September 1971.

e. The General Leonard Wood Army Hospital provides ambulance support to the local community on an emergency basis.

6. Headquarters Command Activities.

a. Companies A and B, Headquarters Command, hosted 22 veterans from the State-Federal Soldiers Home, St. James, Missouri for the Thanksgiving Day Dinner.

b. Company B, Headquarters Command, hosted 20 veterans from the State-Federal Soldiers Home in St. James, Missouri for the Christmas Day Dinner.

c. Company C, Headquarters Command, hosted 44 boy scouts and six adult leaders for two days during February 1972. The scouts, from Florissant, Missouri toured Fort Leonard Wood and lived and ate in troop facilities.

7. 5th CST Brigade Activities.

a. The 5th CST Brigade hosted 50 boy scouts and ten adult leaders from Troop #320, Liberty, Missouri on 10-12 December 1971.

b. The 5th CST Brigade hosted 55 boy scouts and ten adult leaders from Troop #1, Jefferson City, Missouri on 28-30 January 1972.

ANNEX D - Sixth US Army (page 172)

The Presidio of San Francisco, a registered National Historic Landmark, is an open post. During the quarter it has been the subject of a Congressional discussion and proposal to have portions incorporated into an expanded National Seashore Park. Currently, the public is welcome and a scenic automobile drive, historic landmarks and monuments, cycling and hiking paths, and picnic sites are extensively utilized.

Guided Tours of the Post make up the largest single domestic activity. This service is utilized by school classes, civic organizations and youth groups.

A Presidio Historic Trail was established primarily to support Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Campfire Girls, and other officially recognized youth groups. The well-marked trail includes visits to some 27 major points of interest which are described in an available pamphlet, which also includes a route map.

Units of Military Police and the Sixth US Army Band continued to participate in local parades and civic functions.

Reports were also received from US Army Alaska, US Army Hawaii, The Military District of Washington, US Army Air Defense Command, US Army Strategic Communications Command, and US Army Materiel Command.

Many of the activities listed in the above extracts qualify more as public relations items than as bonafide domestic actions, and credence to the fact that the more prevalent reaction to the domestic actions program is somewhat superficial. Also, the scope of participation is not as great as one might be led to believe. The Semi-annual Domestic Action Activity Report numerical data for the period covering 16 September 1971 to 15 March 1972 shows that the Army and its Reserve Components supported 25 million man days of domestic action

participation.¹² That figure is arrived at by multiplying the number of persons times the number of days that they participated in activities ranging from education and training, health and medical assistance, recreational opportunity, transportation, loan and use of equipment, and use of facilities. This showed an increase of 35 percent over the same period of 1971, and might be considered as a positive sign by those in favor of Army participation in domestic action activities.¹³ The more revealing figure, however, was that a total of only 32 thousand military and civilian employees participated in providing support. This would amount to only a small fraction of the overall manpower strength located within the Continental United States. At the same time, a total of only 1.5 million persons were participant-recipients in the support (assuming no duplication in counting), or less than one percent of the Nation's population.

Most of the activities listed in the report were also heavily one-sided; that is, the Army conducted most of the activity with limited contribution by the civilian community. This limits the lasting effect and relationship that is established between the military and the civilian sector.

¹²See Appendix E

¹³Information taken from unpublished report prepared by Major Charles Folluo, Department of the Army Domestic Action Officer, and reproduced with his permission as Appendix F.

CHAPTER V

SWORDES INTO PLOWSHARES

Although many instances of successful participation in domestic actions by the Army have been cited, an increase of the same would not, by itself, be sufficient. Too many of these examples have been one-sided. The military has carried out most of the action with only limited side-by-side response from the civilian community, and it is this integration of effort that presents the best opportunity for removing the breach in civilian/military understanding and mutual acceptance. It is this integration that would allow an all-volunteer Army to open up responsive and meaningful communication with the American public. The Army can and should be regarded as a force capable of making a positive contribution to the country both in peace and war. By past actions it has shown itself capable of this accomplishment.

ON FOREIGN SHORES

The American soldier has shown as great a propensity to build as to destroy. Although it seems to be forgotten rapidly in international circles, history may well record the somewhat unique and selfless response the

United States took toward enemy and ally alike in helping them restore themselves after the ravages of war. The military has been given a large part in conducting these programs of rebuilding and revitalization.

In Korea we have been able to realize the potential of the military structure as a force for economic and social development and for bringing stability to a country in need of help. That story is the story of AFAK, the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea Program.

In 1953, shortly after the cease-fire agreement in Korea, General Maxwell D. Taylor--then commander of all the forces defending the Republic of Korea--proposed that approximately \$15 million worth of U.S. construction materials in Korea, not then required for the original combat projects, should be utilized by U.S. forces personnel in helping to rebuild, at least on a small scale, the war-ravaged nation.

This was the formal beginning of the AFAK Program--a U.S.-sponsored effort aimed at helping the proud citizens of a courageous nation help themselves. As one of the Eighth U.S. Army publications stated, "It is the rebuilding of a country, the rehabilitation of its people; it is American personnel extending the hand of friendship to their Korean allies." Never before has there been, on so large a scale and in so short a time, such a beating of swords into plowshares. Military units sponsored and helped with such projects as school buildings, hospitals, roads, churches, orphanages, and other programs needed throughout the country.¹

The Philippine Army demonstrated that the military can play a significant role in correcting social ills that tend to cause domestic crises. With the country struggling to get back on its feet after WW II, the Huks (Communist insurrectionists) started devastating the countryside with

¹Robert H. Slover, "Guns or plowshares: Military civic action," in Security and a World of Change, ed. Lee W. Farnsworth and Richard B. Gray (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1969), p. 239.

attacks on the constabulary and the Army. They received wide-spread local support from the people who felt that the government was indifferent to their needs.

The late Ramon Magsaysay then stepped into the picture, first as Secretary of Defense and then as President. He took a look at the conventional, frequently terrifying operations of his military and other governmental agencies and found the common people were as afraid of his own forces as they were of the Huks.

President Magsaysay, a barrio man himself, knew that the Tao (Filipino common man) wanted help in agricultural pursuits, medical assistance, education, and some improvement in basic public works. He convinced the Tao that he would help them. He told them he would retrain his military forces to help and protect the common man. In turn, he asked that the Tao stop supporting the Huks and getting information for them.

Under President Magsaysay's concept the military soon became a favorable symbol of the Philippine government and undertook a wide range of social operations. First they helped by protecting them so they could work. Then the military went into community development, care for the sick, school construction, resettlement of Huk sympathizers on land in government holdings. They helped with roads; troop behavior at checkpoints and on patrol was improved. Poor farmers were given legal assistance in the land courts in tenancy cases. By word and deed, President Magsaysay demonstrated to the Tao that it was in their best interests to support the government--not the Communist insurrectionists. As he put it, the armed forces offered the Huks and their sympathizers the hand of all-out friendship. The army called this effort civic action.²

THE NEED AT HOME

There is more to these reports than just historical interest. The communist principle of revolution has made inroads into the domestic tranquility of every country

²Ibid., pp. 240-241.

in the world. Wherever there is discontent it becomes subject to exploitation. It is no longer a stranger to the streets of American communities; and often the soldier has been called on to "keep the peace" at the point of a bayonet pointed at a fellow American. Better this action than anarchy, but how much more could the military do if used in programs aimed at removing causes for discontent. Dr. Robert H. Slover, a retired Army Colonel and Associate Professor of Political Science at Brigham Young University, sees a vital cohesion of military and civilian interests in the development of side-by-side programs which fuse military actions with civilian interests. He lists four basic principles underlying successful military civic action as related to foreign involvement. These same principles may just as well apply to our own domestic sector.

1. Military civic action is essentially a host country program. The United States gives assistance, but the major effort must come from and be desired by the government and the armed forces of the country itself.³

Translated into our own needs, this means that the federal government allows the local community down to individual neighborhoods to voice the types of programs that would be meaningful to them. They are the ones to say how the military can be used to meet the goals of their programs--after being adequately appraised of the capabilities of the military in that direction. A

³Ibid., 238.

person's neighbor is going to be much more receptive to help if he asks for assistance in cleaning his yard, instead of being approached and told, "your yard needs cleaning, let me help you."

2. In putting its many professional skills to use in helping the people to better their living conditions, the military should work with the people, not just for them.⁴

If the neighbor asks for help and then sits in the shade while someone else cleans his yard for him, there will be a loss of respect on both sides. Domestic action projects should be joint-participation projects aimed at developing mutual understanding. An Army Reserve unit volunteered to use its men and equipment in hauling away junk cars. Engineer equipment placed the cars on flat-bed trucks and departed leaving smaller bits of glass and metal. A more meaningful experience could have been developed if the Army had made this a joint project with some Scout Troops or Boys Clubs to assist in cleaning up the leftover residue.

3. By working side by side with the military on civic action projects, the people not only develop better relations with their armed forces but also learn that the military can contribute to economic and social development.⁵

Nothing can replace face to face communication. By working along side the soldier, the civilian will come to know and often be surprised to find a fellow citizen

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 239.

hidden in the uniform--a person with the same aspirations for his country's development and betterment that the civilian shares. He will also discover that the Army has a positive contribution that its men and material can make directly to the individual citizen. Pick and shovel communication has to be better than bayonet confrontation. Additionally, the military is seen as a direct arm of the federal government. Establishing a close working relationship between the military and the local populace has the benefit of establishing a more direct rapport between the federal government and the people. This union bypasses the multiple levels of state and local and departmental bureaucracy that many see as standing between them and the higher levels of elected leadership.

4. Because the maximum benefits are obtained when the people participate, the projects must be ones they desire. . . . immediate-impact, short-term-completion projects have a high priority. Projects must be aimed directly at the people, for it is essential not only that the various projects address themselves to the people's needs, but also that the people are willing to participate in these projects. . . .⁶

The key aspect here is in developing programs that relate directly to the people. It is not inconceivable that an Army division could be given a domestic mission in addition to its requirement to be trained for combat. Consider a division of some 10,000 men, maintaining its combat organization, but trained and equipped to move into a flood threatened area to erect dikes,

⁶Ibid.

provide evacuation, medical care, and security. It could be organized and equipped to assimilate civilian personnel at the squad level to assist in carrying out assigned responsibilities. Professional personnel, such as physicians and attorneys could be meshed to provide more rapid medical care and the expediting of legal actions such as claims and the equitable disbursement of government relief. The logistical capability of the military could be brought to play to provide food and shelter on a scope far in excess of present disaster relief agencies. With other large units similarly trained, and joint plans incremented to fit increasing levels of disaster severity, the military would be capable of initiating large scale operations at a moments notice. With its transportation capability, it could move in force with the same rapidity. The concept would be applicable to almost any disaster such as hurricanes, earthquakes, forest fires, or whatever.

Consider also the feasibility of strategic-level military planning applied to the problems of ecology--an attack, if you will, on the rat and vermin infestation of a deprived area be it urban or rural. Such considerations might sound heretical to the traditional military mind, but both social and environmental conditions are beginning to demand that we think innovatively rather than traditionally. Certainly domestic issues were a consideration in the statement from The Modern Volunteer Army that "we

witness today a public reassessment of our Nation's needs and the movement to a new order of national priorities." It would be an affront to strategic planning to think that the military did not hold a very real stake in our national domestic problems.

It can be pointed out that our earlier historical involvement was unique because there was no other governmental agency organized or equipped to do the job. But one would ignore the fact that the uniqueness of the defense establishment is still equally, if not more important today. No other governmental agency or combination of private concerns has the centralized organization and skills capable of devoting a share of its time and training toward correcting the nation's domestic ills, as does the military. If the organizational flexibility of the military, with its chain-of-command leadership, were utilized, many independent civilian organizations desirous of domestic involvement could more easily be incorporated into a centralized task force to work side by side with the military.

The question of training time can be raised, but it has been pointed out that many military units, often with minimal adjustment, have been shown to have actually increased their military proficiency by "real world" involvement in domestic areas. This does hold true more for units with a particular technical proficiency such as medical or engineering, but there were those who questioned

even this at the beginning. Who can place a limit on the flexibility of any type of military unit once the opportunity for imagination and initiative are opened up?

There is no question that the military must give its first priority to being prepared for hostilities, but first priority need not mean only priority. We have seen that the world community is not prepared to accept the United States as an international police force for peace--so much so that friend as well as foe have come to label us as the intruder. Perhaps because of this, coupled with the monetary drain that our international posture has brought, our citizenry is asking that we take a hard look at our interests and problems here at home.

There are those who are fearful of the Army becoming subject to more criticism as a result of possible clashes with the civilian sector brought on by forays into domestic actions. Evidence, thus far, shows that Army participation has met with a minimum of criticism while evoking considerable praise from the communities in which the action took place. The vital issue that surfaces here is not criticism, however, but the lingering alienation of the military and the civilian sector. That alienation has been seen in the remarks of both military and civilian personnel. If allowed to continue, it will serve to nourish the isolationistic tendencies of the all-volunteer Army. The legions of

Rome, isolated from the citizenry, were often regarded by that citizenry as a greater threat than external enemies. A parallel has at times been portrayed today in the books and movies such as "Seven Days In May," and "Doctor Strangelove." Such a threat may well be absurd, but the fact that it is voiced must be of concern. Allowing the alienation that it fosters to deter a military contribution to helping eradicate domestic ills would be tragic.

WHERE TO FROM HERE?

Given all of the speeches, articles, studies and concern that have been devoted to our ecological and social problems, it should be possible to outline some specific goals to be accomplished. These should be detailed down to reasonable time frames for corrective action and include listings of money, men and material needed to establish a task force capable of implementing that action. Local evaluations are mandatory, but national priorities must be established. With the issues outlined in pragmatic rather than emotional terms, government agencies, including the military, and private concerns could then evaluate their own capabilities for both current and potential contributions. With clear-cut issues and needs outlined down to and including just plain manpower, or muscle power, the capability of each military unit could be assessed and a contributory role assigned. In almost every case, both short and long range paramilitary

training missions could be implemented ranging from natural disaster prevention and relief to urban and rural redevelopment.

Unfortunately, this approach comes close to old-fashioned patriotism, which is now in disrepute. It calls for a selfless, voluntary spirit which seems to be in short supply. It transcends traditional organizational boundaries and bureaucratic procedures which many feel are impossible to break down. It presupposes a military with the flexibility to react to domestic as well as foreign enemies, and a civilian populace more concerned with eradicating domestic and social problems than harboring suspicions and animosities to those in uniform.

DOMESTIC ACTIONS AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY

For the proposed all-volunteer Army, having a part in the revitalization of one's country would be a most honorable mission. A successful program at home could bring international esteem of a quality more lasting, and perhaps more peace-building than that gained by past military victories. Public esteem at home has been one of the benefits of a victorious military. Esteem in the victory over domestic problems would be a worthy tradition to establish.

Domestic action would allow an all-volunteer Army to develop and maintain an outgoing interest in the citizenry and country which it represents. For the citizenry it would open up ways for establishing greater understand-

ing and support for the men in uniform through mutual participation in side-by-side projects. What better way to unravel "the khaki cocoon?"

With the country seeking a new moral commitment, domestic action should be considered on a much higher perspective than its present "voluntary" or "additional duty" relegation. Allowed to become an integral part of the modern volunteer Army mission, that Army could then say with meaningful pride and enthusiasm, America, today, Army wants to join you.

APPENDIX A

FACT SHEET

ARMY SUPPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE DOMESTIC ACTION PROGRAM

DAPE-MPP

FACT SHEET

Maj Folluo/bjm70781

Subject: Army Support of Department of Defense Domestic Action Programs

OBJECTIVE. To utilize the extensive resources of the Department of the Army in cooperation with other governmental and private organizations in a national effort to assist in overcoming our nation's serious domestic problems and contribute to the constructive development of our society.

GOALS.

1. Enhance our ability to promote national security.
2. Help to decrease poverty by providing opportunities for low income youth to develop skills, constructive self-concept and respect for self, community and nation.
3. Enhance mutual respect and cooperation between the Army and the civilian community.

SCOPE.

1. One day tours or shorter visits to military installations.
2. Overnight encampments hosted by Army, sponsored and paid for by other Federal agencies.
3. Loan of equipment to other Federal agencies in support of youth activities.
4. Loan of equipment to assist in emergencies for other disadvantaged people.
5. Involvement in community projects such as ecology and athletic programs.

METHODOLOGY. Domestic actions are conducted on a voluntary basis in cooperation with other Government and private agencies. The Army provides facilities and equipment so long as loan does not interfere with primary mission. Other agencies provide funds and personnel. Supplies and food may be provided in kind or on reimbursable basis. Army personnel, military and civilian, participate on a voluntary basis.

DAPE-MPP

SUBJECT: Army Support of Department of Defense Domestic Action Programs

RECENT EXAMPLES OF ARMY DOMESTIC ACTION PARTICIPATION.

1. Fort Bragg. In cooperation with local and state agencies, Fort Bragg personnel provided medical and other assistance to local Anson and Hope Counties. These are two of the poorest counties in the United States. They gave eye and TB/tine tests to children, cleared brush, plowed, planted and constructed recreation areas in addition to erecting baseball diamonds and backstops. They also repaired and painted several old rural schools and established a summer camp program for wayward boys.
2. Fort Carson. Forty Fort Carson engineers constructed a 76 x 36' Hospital wing to assist the Navajo Indians at the Crown Point Indian Reservation in New Mexico. Construction materials and food and lodging were provided by the Public Health Service and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
3. A joint component effort of national scale was the introduction of Team Handball into American Sports. By May of 1972 over 60,000 youth were participating in this new sport. Additionally, the United States had fielded a team that was successful in winning the honor to represent the Western Hemisphere at the XXI Olympics in Munich. One-half of the US Olympics team are active Army personnel.
4. A current joint project between Active Army, National Guard and Reserve in conjunction with the Appalachian Regional Commission, CEO, and ACTION is the removal of 30,000 abandoned junk automobiles from an eight county area of north central Tennessee.

AWARDS PROGRAM. The DASD (Reserve Affairs) established a Reserve Component Awards Program for outstanding individuals and units who supported the community relations/domestic action programs. Awards consist of a certificate or plaque.

APPENDIX B

XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS AND FORT BRAGG

REGULATION 525-4: DOMESTIC ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS
AND FORT BRAGG
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

Regulation
No. 525-4

22 April 1962

Military Operations
DOMESTIC ACTION

1. Purpose. To outline policy, prescribe procedures and assign responsibilities for the XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg Domestic Action Program.

2. General.

a. The Department of Defense, in its statement of Human Goals, has re-emphasized the role of the military in its contributions to nation building within the United States, to include civic action and community relations.

b. The US Army has a long history of cooperation with other nations to help solve their domestic problems. This accumulated experience represents a valuable asset which is usable and needed within the United States. The reservoir of talent and expertise inherent in the officers and men at Fort Bragg is such that this installation, though primarily focused on its military mission, has the potential to contribute materially to improving the standard of living of the civilian communities about it.

c. The Domestic Action Program offers a unique opportunity to this command to carry out practical, realistic training in the internal development aspects of stability operations. In this connection, many projects which appear infeasible on the surface may be accomplished in connection with training.

3. Definitions.

a. Domestic Action - Military civic action and community relations activities designed to assist the civilian leadership in solving their community problems.

b. Civic Action - Military civic action is the use of military forces, in cooperation with civilian authorities, agencies or groups, on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, public works, health, sanitation, and others contributing to the economic and social development which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.

c. Community Relations - The relationship between military and civilian communities, including such actions as cooperation with local government officials and community leaders; participation of military personnel and dependents in activities of local schools, churches, fraternal, social, and civic organizations; sports and recreation programs; conducting tours and open houses; participation in public events; liaison and cooperation with local associations and organizations; people to people programs; and humanitarian acts.

4. Objectives.

a. The objective of this Domestic Action Program is to utilize the available Fort Bragg resources, in cooperation with local government and civic organizations, in an effort to overcome domestic problems and contribute to the overall constructive development of society in civilian communities.

b. In this regard it is expected that:

(1) Each military organization at Fort Bragg will participate in the overall effort to improve the quality of community life in general, in the vicinity of Fort Bragg.

(2) All commanders and staff section chiefs will support the Domestic Action Program to the greatest extent possible without degrading their military missions.

(3) This program will provide the disadvantaged people of the area with increased educational, recreational, cultural, health, and welfare opportunities.

(4) It will enhance the mutual respect and cooperation between the military and the civilian community, thereby building a more favorable image of the Army in the eyes of the American public, and at the same time contribute to the achievement of the goal of an all voluntary Army.

5. Guidelines.

a. The greatest asset of this command lies in the reservoir of talent and expertise possessed by its officers

and men. Commanders will actively seek ways to utilize these personnel resources as well as other resources of their units in support of the Domestic Action Program to the fullest extent possible, without jeopardizing mission accomplishment.

f. The use of military facilities, equipment, and/or property will be in keeping with command guidance. All of these resources will be carefully evaluated on a case-by-case basis so that conflicts with local enterprise are avoided and all legal requirements met.

g. Only those tasks will be undertaken which have the approval and support of the appropriate civilian authorities. When possible, active civilian participation should be provided for.

h. Projects will be fully coordinated, as required, with appropriate federal, state, regional, county, city and local authorities.

i. All projects will be planned so that, when completed, they can be effectively maintained and managed by the appropriate civilian agency.

j. Medical or paramedical projects will be developed to augment existing civilian programs in the community. New medical projects will be undertaken as requested and approved by appropriate civilian authorities.

k. Duplication of existing projects will be avoided. However, projects may be undertaken which supplement existing civilian projects.

l. Projects must benefit as wide a spectrum of the community as practicable, and must be nondiscriminatory in nature.

6. Domestic Action Program

a. The overall Domestic Action Program is divided into four broad fields or areas as outlined below. The omission of an area or project in this broad listing does not preclude its consideration, as it is difficult to compile fully a definitive listing for all situations. Also, many projects will present themselves as the overall situation develops, and may be supported if justifiable.

(1) Education and Recreation:

(a) Provide vocational training through the Summer Employment of Youth Program, the Neighborhood Youth Corps Program, summer encampments and active participation in local vocational programs.

(b) Provide assistance, in coordination with local educators, to supplement community education program.

(c) Expand the military speakers program and invite civilian attendance at seminars where appropriate, with emphasis on objectives of the Domestic Action Program.

(d) Encourage a professional education and recreation exchange program.

(e) Establish coaching clinics and provide assistance to community recreational programs and facilities.

(2) Health and Sanitation:

(a) Improve sanitation and personal hygiene by conducting classes in local disadvantaged areas. These classes may be in conjunction with Operation Headstart or adult education classes.

(b) Encourage volunteer specialists and technicians to participate in first aid and life saving seminars and classes for volunteer firemen, rescue squads, etc.

(c) Encourage an exchange of information in all related fields such as garbage and sewage disposal, insect and rodent control, environmental pollution control, etc.

(d) Encourage volunteer participation in civilian medical assistance programs for the needy.

(e) Assist the local government in determining the source of water pollution and recommend actions to improve the condition.

(f) Participation in local civilian drug abuse programs.

(g) Encourage participation in civilian programs directed toward improving the quality of living in local communities.

(3) Public Administration:

(a) Encourage volunteer participation in the volunteer fire departments of surrounding communities.

(b) Assist local communities by professional exchange programs dealing with health, sanitation, utilities and other areas of community government.

(c) Encourage an exchange of information in the police and fire-fighting fields.

(d) Provide assistance in city planning and organization, as requested by local authorities.

(4) Community Development and Social Welfare:

(a) Support local youth programs and encourage participation in these programs by disadvantaged youth.

(b) Provide assistance and support to orphanages, schools, hospitals, etc.

(c) Provide coordination between military social welfare services and local government and private welfare agencies.

(d) Provide guided tours of Fort Bragg, its military life and activities.

(e) Encourage civilian participation in post activities by conducting open houses, demonstrations, concerts, etc.

b. While voluntary participation is to be encouraged, it must be emphasized that a program of this importance cannot always be accomplished on a purely voluntary basis. In this connection, projects should be tied to the training objectives of the command whenever possible. Often, this may be the only way in which military participation can be justified.

7. Administration.

a. Sound and aggressive planning, coordination, and supervision are vital to the success of this program.

b. The ACofS, G5 is assigned primary staff responsibility for the development, coordination, and staff supervision of the Domestic Action Program. Regardless of the source of projects, all proposals will start their official processing with the ACofS, G5. He will establish and maintain an SOP for processing requests connected with the Domestic Action Program.

c. The ACofS, G5 will maintain close coordination with the Commanding General's Civilian Advisory Committee in order to assure cooperation, assistance and project acceptance by the local populace.

d. The XVIII Airborne Corps Surgeon will serve as the Domestic Action Medical Coordinator for XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg and will serve as the Medical Advisor to the ACofS, G5.

e. Each subordinate and tenant unit and Corps Staff

agency will appoint an officer who will serve as his commander or supervisor's point of contact. This officer, pertaining to Domestic Action, will be able to conduct preliminary planning of a given project in which his unit or staff may be tasked for certain actions. He should be in the grade of at least O-3 when possible. The ACOIS, GS will be provided with the names of individuals selected. Names of individuals selected will be reported within 15 days of receipt of this regulation.

F. Specific Letters of Instructions will be published as needed to provide more specific guidance for projects and tasks within the overall Domestic Action Program.

8. Funding.

a. Projects which involve additional costs to the Army must be avoided, or undertaken only when such costs are reimbursable. However, each project must be examined thoroughly to ascertain the availability of outside assistance before it is turned down due to lack of funds. In some cases collaboration with other agencies will result in suitable funding arrangements. Many Federal Agencies are authorized to reimburse the military for expenses incurred in support of various related programs and local government or private agencies are often willing to provide necessary funds.

b. Existing resources at Fort Bragg permit a wide range of support for the Domestic Action Program. Leadership, technical skills and support can be provided at no additional cost to the Army through the use of volunteers, and certain facilities such as camping areas, picnic areas, and buildings. The participation in projects in connection with required training will justify the use of training funds.

9. References.

a. DOD DIR 5050.37.

b. AR 1-210.

c. AR 1-211.

d. AR 28-17.

e. AR 28-19.

f. AR 28-52.

g. AR 70-26

h. AR 360-61

FOR THE COMMANDER: (A/ACG/Tel 68703)

APPENDIX C

THE FIRST OFF DIVIDEND

THE DUST OFF DIVIDEND

by Andrew Schneider

Glare from the approaching headlights reflected off the wet pavement, punctuating the trance-like state I was in after long hours of night driving. Five hours earlier we had finished packing the last of our camping gear into our new VW bus, and my daughter, son-in-law, wife and I had started off on a long-awaited vacation to Mexico. "We never made it," said the Texas doctor.

"I'd seen it happen so often on TV it took me a while to realize it was actually happening to us. I didn't want to believe that the cattle truck speeding toward us was really on our side of the road, but it was. There was nothing I could do but pull over on the shoulder and lean on the horn. The driver was fighting a losing battle to keep his huge truck from fishtailing on the rain-slicked highway.

"It seemed like hours, but it was only a split-second before the truck slammed into the back of our bus and sent us flying into the concrete drainage ditch. The bus rolled over once and came to rest on its side. It was just as I imagined it might be: Flashes of light. The sound of breaking glass. Screams. Then silence.

"I released my seatbelt and helped my wife through

the hole where the windshield had popped out. I'm 67-years old and not in very good shape, but somehow I managed to pull out my son-in-law. I crawled back in to get my girl and found she was pinned in her seat by the wreckage. She was alive but unconscious.

"As I backed out of the twisted steel of the bus I found a Texas highway patrolman trying to calm my wife. Thanks to our seatbelts, our only injuries were a few minor cuts. The trooper told me he had radioed for an ambulance and then he crawled inside to try and help my daughter. I yelled for him to try and find my medical bag and I started examining the boy. He had broken both his legs, had internal injuries and was losing blood rapidly from a gash in his neck. The trooper reappeared, saying she was still unconscious and he couldn't get her out without more help. He couldn't get my bag out of the crumpled steel, but he brought me the first aid kit from his car.

"I've been a doctor for more than 30 years, but this night I felt utterly helpless. The 4x4 bandages weren't large enough to stop the blood spurting from the boy's neck. When the trooper told me we were 25 miles from the closest hospital I knew the boy would never make it alive.

"I went back to check on my daughter. Her pulse and respiration were strong, but there were indications of a head injury. The trooper was still trying to pull apart the mangled seats which held her, but they wouldn't budge. He said that he had just heard over the police radio that

the truck that hit us had run off the road at the bottom of the hill and the driver had been killed instantly.

"I didn't hear it at first but the trooper started waving his flashlight toward the sky. Suddenly a high-pitched whine filled the air and a bright light flooded the accident scene. All I could see was a spotlight coming through the drizzle, but as it got closer I could make out a large red cross. I couldn't believe what I was seeing. This was Vietnam. Who expects to see an Army helicopter land on the highway in the middle of Texas?

"As the ship landed on the highway above, the swirling blades sent a cloud of water washing down over us in the ditch. Two men in uniforms jumped out with a litter and came sliding down the slope. The highway patrolman led one of the GIs into the overturned bus and the other started working on the boy.

"Within a few minutes they had managed to free my daughter and then carefully moved her up the slope to the helicopter. In the meantime, the other medic had applied a large pressure bandage to the boy's neck and the bleeding had slowed to a trickle. I was amazed by the young GI's proficiency. After he stopped the bleeding, he gently placed two inflatable balloon type splints around the broken limbs. With the help of his partner, he carefully lifted the boy onto another litter and they placed him in the helicopter.

"Seconds after the crew chief buckled my wife and me into the canvas seats of the helicopter, we were airborne

and heading toward the hospital. The medic who was on the helicopter was going into deep shock from the loss of blood, and I knew he was going to start an intravenous injection. I couldn't believe the skill of this GI. He wasn't a day past 21, but working under the dim red night light of the cramped helicopter he started the IV with an ease and speed which no match any physician I've ever met.

"It's been more than a year since the accident and everyone has recovered. I am sure that if it were not for the skill and dedication of the GI pilots and medics in man those air ambulances, my son-in-law wouldn't be alive today. I found out later that the ground ambulance didn't arrive for another 20 minutes. By that time we were already at the hospital being treated.

"I hate to admit it now, but prior to the accident I had very little use for the military. I would think of the Army and all I could see was killing. That one night changed me. The Army is saving lives and doing it right here in the States. What greater peacetime mission can there be for the military?"

This true story of how U.S. Army medics saved a Texas doctor's son-in-law from what might have been an otherwise routine death in a highway accident was one of many told FAMILY. Over and over, civilians told us they were impressed by the common sense the services showed in using helicopter medevac ("Dust Off") techniques perfected in Vietnam to save lives that might otherwise have been lost.

The doctor wasn't aware of it at the time, but his son-in-law's life was saved by a new program -- Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST). It's a rare example of three government agencies successfully working together to save lives.

Perhaps more unusual is the evidence that everyone involved in MAST is getting something. Many of the 2.3 million Americans who are killed or injured on the nation's highways each year now have a better chance to reach a hospital alive. Servicemen bored by garrison duty and "dry run" training after the combat action of Vietnam feel they are doing something useful and vital again. And, finally the image of the military is being improved in the eyes of many Americans who previously had found little good in the armed forces.

MAST began in July 1970 with the 507th Medical Co. at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., near San Antonio. For the next six months its pilots, medics and 15 H-model Hueys were involved in a test to evaluate the use of combat medical evacuation (medevac) techniques on civilian emergencies.

Within a month, the program-sponsoring Department of Defense, Transportation, and Health, Education and Welfare had activated four additional MAST test sites -- two Air Force at Mountain AFB, Idaho, and Luke AFB, Ariz., and two additional Army at Fort Carson, Colo. and Fort Lewis, Wash.

The initial team of the 507th was off to a rapid start with the unit performing emergency missions in the first two weeks of the program, with five occurring in one 24-hour period.

Today, the 10 civilian hospitals in the San Antonio area are all very much involved and concerned with the project. They all have announced a willingness to receive MAST patients and have agreed to provide a landing pad and a radio for communicating with the choppers. The San Antonio program covers the 5,000 square miles of San Antonio and its nine surrounding counties.

As it happens, many of the 507th missions from the beginning have involved transporting sick and injured children from small hospitals and clinics to the well-equipped Children's Hospital in San Antonio. One young medic said, "I flew medevacs in Nam for two years. I know it sounds silly, but to survive you have to build up almost an immunity to the sights and sounds of the wounded and dying men. My first MAST patient was a badly injured child. It really tore me up. The baby was too young to talk and she just lay there looking up with the biggest, saddest blue eyes I've ever seen."

The small south Texas town of Dilley has a population of about 2,000. During the first six months of the program, the 507th has transported several of the town's children to San Antonio. To show their appreciation the people of Dilley invited the entire unit down for a large barbecue. An old Dust Off crew chief said, "It really made

and feel great. We used to be raining, it had been raining for a day, and now we're not raining, so they're going to help the people who really need it. These people can't afford to have a spread like that, but they wanted to do it just to say thanks."

As the MAST program neared the end of its first six-month test period, public appeals for a continuation of the project flowed into military headquarters in Washington and San Antonio:

. The area's leading newspaper, The San Antonio Light, pleaded editorially with Secretary of Defense Holt to continue the "vital, lifesaving service."

. An administrator of San Antonio's largest hospital wrote to DoD's Secretary, John Volpe, and said, "This unprecedented program could save countless lives, and our citizens must continue to benefit from the medical assistance rendered by these highly trained crews."

. Another hospital official said, "Discontinuance of the MAST service would be a tragic loss to many lives . . . and the community."

. An old woman from Braunfels, Tex., whose grandson was evacuated by the JOYCE in time for doctors to successfully patch a hole in his lungs, wrote to the commanding general of Fort Sam Houston with an emotional plea, saying that the men of the JOYCE be permitted to continue "to do their work."

The program was not terminated. It was extended

for six months, and then another six. Each time the unit completed a mission, the publicity in local newspapers and TV would make more people aware of their availability. The same thing happened at all test sites. The five VAM programs gained momentum with each passing year.

Although the basic plan called for MAST to be used for highway injuries, their missions have been ranging from gamblers from heart attacks to gunshot wounds. A commander at Fort Lewis said, "If we can save a life by scrambling a chopper, we'll send it, regardless of how the injury occurs."

One of the best examples of the usefulness of MAST occurred in September 1971 near Salina, Colo. In one of the worst single-vehicle accidents in Colorado's history, a bus carrying the Gunnison High School football team went out of control and crashed on 11,000-foot Monarch Pass in the Rockies. Eight football players and a teacher were killed, and the remaining 40 passengers were injured, 15 seriously.

Local ambulance and medical facilities immediately were overloaded and the Colorado Highway Patrol called for help from the MAST unit at Fort Carson. Three Army helicopters from the 78th Medical Det. arrived in Salina within the hour. The 15 boys with serious injuries were flown to St. Luke's Hospital in Denver, where doctors credit the speedy transport and careful treatment en route with saving several lives.

70,

A more recent rescue early this year demonstrated the extremes to which a MAST crew will go to save a life. The alert crew of the MAST operation at Luke AFB, Ariz. received a call from the Arizona State Police shortly after midnight on February 23. A jeep with a family of three had been trapped in a rockslide in the mountains 260 miles east of the base. A large boulder had smashed through the side of the vehicle and fractured the skull of the eight-year-old daughter.

The stubby HH-43 helicopter used by the Air Force is limited to a 100-mile flight range. Because of this, in a display of good advance planning, the MAST unit months before had dropped emergency fuel supplies at several sites around the state. En route to the rockslide, they stopped at Globe, Ariz. and refueled the aircraft from 55-gallon drums. Within another hour, they were over the mountains hunting for the accident.

Landing a chopper in a narrow ravine in the daylight is difficult enough, but doing it in total darkness is almost impossible. As the chopper hovered overhead, the state police marked the area with red road flares. Luckily, the HH-43 made a gentle landing on the rocky ground. Within minutes the injured girl and her parents were loaded aboard, and the chopper headed out of the mountains.

Thirty minutes later, fuel again was becoming a problem. But within seconds after the fuel warning light turned red, the back-up chopper from Luke came into view.

Both choppers landed in an open area and the civilians were transferred to the new chopper for the final leg of the flight to St. Joseph's Hospital in Phoenix. Fuel was trucked out to the remaining helicopter, and it promptly returned to its base station at Luke.

The girl was in bad shape when she got to the hospital, but her condition is improving. Once again, a doctor said his patient would have died without help from MAST.

As MAST expands to cover additional states and cities, more lives will be saved. And the military men involved will go home each night with the knowledge that they are part of a program which does so much . . . for so many.

New concepts like MAST may seem revolutionary but the practice of military men and equipment helping civilian communities is not new.

Hurricanes, floods, earthquakes and other disasters have always brought a rapid response from local military commands. And the Coast Guard has been rescuing civilians since its inception in 1790. Last year it responded in more than 53,000 search and rescue missions and rendered aid to more than 120,000 civilians.

In the late 1960s the Department of Transportation's National Highway Safety Bureau conducted studies which showed that thousands of accident victims were dying needlessly because of a combination of a lack of proper emergency transportation and ambulance crews that have little or no

medical training.

As a result of these studies, DoD and AEM set down a series of guidelines for an Emergency Medical Care System which would provide for a rapid response of properly equipped emergency vehicles staffed with well-trained crews who could sustain and prolong life through proper first aid measures, both at the scene and in transit.

Though federal funds are available for the program, it will be several years before enough men can be trained and equipped to make any dent in soaring civilian casualty figures.

In early 1970, DoD said that a ready-made force of well-trained and highly experienced paramedical personnel was becoming available due to the winding-down of the war in Vietnam. It was suggested by Secretary of Defense Laird that hundreds of medics and chopper crewmen might be used to fill the nationwide need for qualified rescuemen. Four months later, MAST was born.

This may be one of the only military assistance programs ever to be implemented that didn't cost the taxpayer an extra penny. Capt. Jerry Kinsey, a pilot with Fort Sam Houston's 507th, explained, "All chopper units must fly a minimum number of training missions each week. This we accomplished by flying out to the field and picking up simulated casualties. With MAST, we get in our required flying time, and, using the same amount of fuel and medical supplies, we are now saving lives."

After watching programs based on rescue techniques on TV, millions of Americans may think their local ambulance crews also can do everything, including open heart surgery. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Less than 5 percent of the civilian emergency squads in the country, said a NAST spokesman, are equipped or trained to do most of the procedures shown on the shows. Several of the larger local units are starting to carry defibrillators (electric shock heart starters) and other cardiac-resuscitation gear, but this is still very rare. The point is that the speed at which a patient is transported to the hospital may be secondary to the treatment he receives en route. The average ambulance crew in this country has the training and supplies to stop most bleeding, splint broken limbs and administer oxygen. In many rural areas where the ambulance duties are often a sideline of the funeral home, even this basic knowledge is missing sometimes.

Yet even if a crew member is experienced or trained in advance emergency techniques, he still is forbidden by many state laws from performing them unless he is a doctor. For example, an ex-Navy medical corpsman who is now a member of a volunteer rescue squad in suburban Washington, D. C., commented, "The Maryland medical practice laws are keeping us from saving lives. In one three-week period, our squad transported two people who were DCA (Dead on arrival) at the hospital. Using the skills I learned in the Navy I could have saved them both. One was an old man

who had a head injury from a car crash, and the other a young woman who had some food lodged in her throat -- neither could breathe. All it would have taken to save their lives was a simple trach (a small cut into the trachea, which allows air to enter the lungs when the throat is blocked). Even though I did more than 10 of these in Nam, the law still says no . . . so they die."

If the young corpsman was still on active duty and assigned to a MAST operation, he wouldn't be working under such restrictive conditions. All of the MAST medics FAMILY interviewed said their instructions are to do whatever possible to save a life.

Captain Kinsey said, "Ninety-five percent of our crews pulled duty in Vietnam. Our medics got more experience treating severe trauma in one year than most civilian paramedical types get in a lifetime. It's a touchy point, but if a medic feels that by starting an IV or doing a trach he's improving the patient's chance of survival, he'll do it. Nobody has complained yet."

When FAMILY asked the Justice Department its opinion on the legality of this aspect of the MAST program, a spokesman -- who asked not to be identified -- said, "We're holding our breath. I admit the medics may be bending a few laws, but they're saving a hell of a lot of lives as they do it. I suppose sooner or later someone may try to bring a suit against the Army for their rescue efforts, but maybe the medical practice laws will be broadened before that happens."

This past February, the MAST coordinating committee (POF, DoD and HEW) announced that the program, which would be extended to other areas of the country. A committee spokesman explained: "MAST operations will be conducted only where existing aero-medical and air-transport units are now situated and only after extensive site examinations and discussions with local civilian officials. Military personnel and equipment will not compete with qualified civilian medical services, nor will a military unit have MAST as its sole duty."

The way MAST programs are now planned, Army and Air Force units will carry the brunt of the burden, with the Coast Guard jumping in when their overburdened personnel are available. The fact that neither the Navy nor the Marine Corps are involved in the program has drawn harsh but candid comments from some MAST officials. One high-ranking Marine officer said, "There are enough serious accidents between Norfolk, Va., and Camp Lejeune, N.C., to keep a full MAST unit busy just transporting the military and their dependents, let alone civilians. The roads are crowded and there is often a wait of more than an hour before an ambulance can reach the scene of an accident."

When the Marine Corps was asked why it wasn't involved in MAST, a spokesman told FAMILY, "The limited number of helicopters we have are all assigned to missions which routinely require them to deploy with the Fleet Marine Force on short notice." The spokesman added, "I admit

with a lot of careful planning with a lot of coordination problems, but then we still would have to get the Navy to assign additional men for the program."

When FAMILY approached the Navy with the same question, its spokesmen's responses were even more confusing. We contacted the office of the Secretary of the Navy and a spokesman said, "I want to be involved, but none of our helicopters have rescue capabilities. But we support the program in spirit." FAMILY checked the 1972 edition of Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet and found that of the 16 different types of helicopters in the Navy's inventory, at least 15 were designed to perform rescue missions as a secondary duty.

We called Navy headquarters again to get a comment on what our research had shown. A different spokesman said, "We are not involved because the Secretary of the Navy said we won't be, and that's reason enough."

Feeling the Navy still could give us a better answer, we tried a third Navy spokesman. His answer was short and to the point, but perhaps closer to the truth: "The Navy has many helicopters, but they're all equipped for special missions, and not for air rescue. As far as the availability of corpsmen, the Navy is 50 percent under its authorized strength for corpsmen, and the few we have can't be spared for non-military duties."

Despite the lack of complete cooperation of all services, a MAST project officer said he was worried because

the program was going to be successful. We said, "Anytime the military gets involved with the civilian sector, we've come to expect a fair amount of snafu. When we started MAST we expected snafu from everyone from the American Helicopter Association to the FAA. It's been two years now and all we've gotten is praise. We must be doing something right."

Perhaps the thing that's making the road so smooth is the careful and thorough planning needed prior to a new MAST site's activation. An example of this is a meeting held February 28 at Fort Jackson, S.C. Attending the meeting were members of more than 20 groups interested in obtaining MAST for a statewide program. They included South Carolina state and local police, hospital officials, disaster rescue and medical groups, local military and the MAST committee.

The meeting had been the idea of the director of South Carolina's highway safety program, Brig. Gen. Roland Barnick (USAF, Ret.). Working through the governor's office, Barnick had requested the commander of Fort Jackson, Maj. Gen. William Coleman, to set up the meeting.

The MAST Committee had been averaging about 16 of these meetings each month at various places in the country. Each of the members smoothly presented his part of the story of MAST, its background, problems, advantages and limitations. They then covered what obligations the state would have to fulfill before the project could be started.

The main prerequisites were that each of the 12 large hospitals and the 30 rural medical centers in the state would have to provide some method of communications between the hospitals and the service rescue units, such as a "hell-stop" (a flat area with a flat road) for landing landings.

The remainder of the morning was spent discussing the medical-legal aspects, the best methods of involving the smaller communities, and countless other topics. A member of the governor's staff summed up the morning by saying, "Most of us came to the meeting with a lot of questions and some doubts. When we left a few hours later, the doubts were gone, and we felt we had started a good program that would save a hell of a lot of lives."

Around the world, Air Force rescue crews wear a special patch on their flight suits. It shows an angel holding a globe, and printed below is a motto -- "That Others May Live." If the NAST program becomes a regular part of the services' Stateside activities, within the next 12 months there may be at least 30 NAST units throughout the country. And many "others" who might have died may live, thanks to Vietnam's Dust Off dividend.

APPENDIX D

TRAIL, COLORADO
CENTER, COLORADO

THE WASHINGTON POST

February 19, 1971

CIVIL ACTION: ARMY'S NEW PATTERNS

by George C. Wilson and Haynes Johnson

CENTER, Colo.--It was a relief, after so many years of Vietnam, to look down from the gunner's perch of a Huey helicopter and this time see soft yellow farm fields unscarred by bomb craters.

Spread out below on the floor of the San Luis Valley, surrounded by the awesome Colorado Mountains was the farm town of Center, population 1,460. Sixty percent of the people are Chicanos. Most of them are poor. Center, long ignored by the rest of the world is now the battleground for a new type of war being fought by the U.S. Army.

This time, though, the war has a constructive--if not altogether uncontroversial--purpose. There are no guns, no search-and-destroy missions and no body counts.

If the Army wins this new war, Secretary of the Army Robert T. Frockhake and other leaders believe, better days are coming for the institution.

The Army is calling its new war "homeland action." The idea is to use Army resources to help impoverished

commanders help themselves. There is a great deal of
one the 12th Division under the 1st. Some of the
units, the 12th Division and the 1st Division, are
and other technological training and other things.
The 12th Division is also the 1st Division and the
are winning the Army back to the 12th Division and the
to be in peace time.

Meanwhile, some politicians and some
of the 12th Division and the 1st Division are
offices, however good the intentions. The 12th Division
action seems like pacification all over again-- despite
the bitter experience with it in Vietnam.

The Army leadership knows all this. In fact,
however, that such criticism can be answered successfully
if the critics will only look at domestic action dis-
passionately and not through eyes blurred by Vietnam.

Center is one of the places the Army invites its
critics to inspect. Froelike himself went to the town and
commented enthusiastically on what he saw. He wants the
Army to do more of it.

The beauty of domestic action, Froelike says, is
that the soldiers can perform the training they would have
to undergo any way and yet they can do it where they can
see positive results.

The young people in the Army, the document
says, "are far more idealistic, far better motivated than
any contemporaries back in World War II. They want to feel

They want to feel as though they're contributing to the overall good.

"Now, if we can explain the peace-keeping mission of the Army, that's one step" toward convincing young Americans that the Army is not just "a war machine. It's a machine prepared to wage war in order to keep the peace. Now the is not just semantics: that's vital if we're going to get these young people in the Army." (sic)

Freehake--who only took office on July 1--said that public relations considerations are part of the appeal of domestic action. Such projects explain "to the public generally that we have human beings in the Army that have the same human motivation, the same desires as anybody else. And they want to help a guy who is down and out, a community who is down and out."

Center--part of it, anyhow--is indeed down and out. From the helicopter, it looks like a grid of low adobe structures plopped amid yellow and green farm fields running up to the mountains. Up close, the Chicano sections are slums: abandoned cars in the alleys, wood piles to burn for heat, outside privies, no running water. Some children get sick on the poisoned water coming from backyard surface wells.

The residents, living off widely spaced harvest checks, cannot afford to pay for either paved streets or running water. The surrounding beauty of the Colorado countryside masks the ruin of many of the people here.

The Army--in the form of a small unit--a full boxer and a front-line leader--came in to help this year. The first invitation was issued, incidentally enough, by Terry Marshall, a conscientious engineer who directs the federal government's Head Start program here, when he asked the Army to take in some surplus government equipment.

Maj. Gen. John C. Bennett, commander of Ft. Carson told a local citizens group that the Army could do more. Much of the work Center needed to have done would provide useful training for the soldiers, he said. Bennett stressed that the Army could provide only the manpower and equipment, not the money or material. Also, he said, the town itself must decide what it wanted from the Army. And it would have to submit a request.

From then on, amazing things began to happen in Center, recalls Marshall, who says that--although it is his home town--the townspeople consider him and anything else connected to federal welfare as radical, if not communistic.

"The Army," said Marshall, "gave me credibility. The old attitude around here was, 'If it has to come from OEO (Office of Economic Opportunity), we don't want it whether we need it or not.' But the people around here trust the Army. So when they saw us working together, I was able to get someplace."

Besides that, the town realized it had to organize

itself to obtain benefits from the Army. This was the
the Planning Commission. When, on the other
for the first time in years, Angkor Wat
around the same table and jointly decided that the
needs must be met by the Army could provide.

The decision was made by a group of
makers, braised as they are then place revolution
about the American role in Vietnam's "tiger cages." For
the town of Center decided that what must be built first
was a town jail.

That is what the Army engineers are working on
now. It brings to mind the World War II novel, "A Bell
for Adano," in which the Italian villagers explain to the
U.S. Army major that what their town needs most is a bell.

"You wouldn't want to put anybody you knew in that
place," said a policeman of the jail being replaced. "We
have to send our juveniles and any women to another town
if they get arrested," said a Center housewife. "The
jail we have now is a disgrace," said a civic leader here.

So every morning and every afternoon, the people
of Center see a group of Army GIs dressed in fatigues and
armed with hammers and saws building their new jail along
side the town hall.

At night, the officers retire to makeshift quar-
ters in the white cement building still sporting the name
Long Horn Cafe. The enlisted men sleep in the basement of
Center's Catholic church.

One of the men interviewed was a young man in jail in Blumenthal Davis, a veteran of 23 years serving time as a pure Sioux, a man who has lived on an Indian reservation. "I hope," he said, "that the Army officer is here in and helps these people on Indian reservations. I hope it will. It would really be a good thing."

Other soldiers interviewed had similar comments. Their theme was that if Army machines and men have to be here anyway, why not use them where they can do some good, rather than keep them tied to a base with menial duties?

Lt. Juan Gomez is the closest thing to a field commander for the Army effort at Center. Only 24, he is credited by local citizens with sensitivity and understanding far beyond his years. A Chicano himself, he knows what discrimination feels like.

"My teacher paddled me in front of the class once because I spoke Spanish, not English," he recalls.

Gomez found Army life miserable-- still he got this chance to help his own people. Yet he realized that if he, as a representative of the Army, offends one people here, the whole domestic action program will suffer. To walk with him around the little town of Center is like walking with a politician with a sure feel for his constituency.

To a fellow Chicano asking about whether the Army intends to pave the streets and put in water, Gomez answers

Spanish; to the mayor of Center, to the school board, and to the commanders who come through the town occasionally to check up, he uses military terminology. At the citizens meetings of the town council, planning committee, school board. All are places that may wish to ask what the Army can do.

"It's good for the Army," says Gomez of domestic action work, "because it gives the soldier some sense of accomplishment, some usefulness. And it is very realistic training."

The townspeople find it benefits them, too. "The Army has been real good for our town," says Mayor Ed L. Edwards. "We haven't had any real trouble. I haven't had a single complaint about them. The thing of it is, we won't have any funds to do what they're doing for us."

Further testimony to the long-term poverty of Center is the town hall built by President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Works Progress Administration in 1937. Now the town fathers are asking the Army to modernize; they still do not have enough money to pay for the labor required.

At a trailer-sized clinic the Army helped build for Center, the director talked of the unifying force of this military presence in what is supposed to be an anti-military era in the United States.

"I don't think we can have accomplished anything

without the Army bringing the community to order," James Archuleta said. "Every time I think the Army is going away, I wonder."

Texaspeople, the local newspaper editor, clinic leaders, policemen -- all had mixed feelings about the Army's activities. This does not mean there is no resentment, but the prevailing view is positive. Social worker Karseloff says he now regards the Army "as another resource to be used for good." He would like to see the Army go beyond construction and accept some of Center's young people into its training schools to learn marketable skills.

One negative comment came from Dr. Anthony J. Sliwowski, the dentist at Center's new clinic. "I was a little resentful of the Army coming in here and finishing the clinic," he said. He feared the people would come to lean on the Army as the Eskimos relied on the white traders, only to be abandoned.

Back in Washington, at the Pentagon, there also are some reservations about the Army's getting into community action programs. Brig. Gen. Robert C. Caro Jr., for one, wrote in the magazine Foreign Affairs that "it would be wrong to use military units to engage in civic action projects in American cities, for this would thrust the armed services into sensitive activities for which they are unqualified. Poor performance in these projects, or even controversy over selection of priorities, could lead to further resentment of the military establishment..."

...and if we can't do it, I think we have to go to the
domestic action, it will have to be a domestic action -
domestic action of domestic action. But the action will be
right with action. Froelke, looking at the situation, is
intending to increase the Army's domestic action, action.

"We must do more, and more," Froelke said. "The
long as we limit it to something that will help the soldier
in his training mission: as long as we can accomplish our
other goals without adding more men or more soldiers, we
have no limitation.

"I don't see the politicians objecting," he said,
"because we don't take over the leadership."

Some Army strategists argue that the time is coming
when killing people will be an unacceptable form of war-
fare. Killing would be done only as a last resort, they
theorize, just as dropping the H-bomb is looked upon as the
last resort nowadays. But winning over uncommitted peoples
through dramatic improvements in their surrounding may in-
deed be the battleground for contending world powers. If
so, they reason, domestic action may turn out to be the
most critical military training of all.

Froelke believes that day is still far off, "but
I think, and hope, we're heading in that direction. And
as we get closer to that time, domestic action has to be-
come more and more important."

CENTER TOWN RESIDENTS, TUCUMAN, ARG. 12/17/67



ARMY AWARDS TO CIVILIAN — 1st Lieutenant Juan C. Gomez, left, a man most Centerites (not acquainted with, or at least knew by sight), won the Army Commendation Medal for his work as project officer on the Domestic Action program here in Center this past summer. To add even more distinction to the award, four leading citizens of Center, journeyed to Ft. Carson to be present for the ceremony. Friends here will regret hearing that Lieutenant Gomez has left the Army and will not be in charge of future Army programs here. Major General John C. Burdett, commanding general, at right, made the presentation. Those from Center included Jerry Vancil, director of Sagache County Health Clinic; Ray A. Fox, banker and chairman of the Planning Commission; Joe Garcia, member of the town board; and Mayor Kent A. Janda. The presentation was made Wednesday, Dec. 17, the occasion of Gomez' exit from the service. (U.S. Army photo)

REPORT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

FOR THE YEAR 1964

The Board of Directors of the Center for the Study of the American Indian, Inc. (CSAI) is pleased to report on the work of the Center during the year 1964. The survey was made for the possible installation of the sewer system for the Center.

April 11, 1961

Mr. J. B. Jones
U.S. Army, Fort Carson

A group of personnel from the U.S. Army, Fort Carson, visited the town, the meeting called for law, and the group consisted of a lawyer, a doctor, and a military officer. The group plans to go to the Army base at Fort Carson, and will meet with members of the Planning Commission, and other officials of the town and other projects. The group plans to go to the town and other projects to be done by the town.

Major Reed and Captain Pacheco have been ordered to their duties with the program. Major Reed has been promoted to Provost Marshall at Fort Carson and Captain Pacheco has been transferred to Harvard University where he will study law.

Dr. Carl Francisco has been appointed the new Domestic Action Officer and will be present when the group makes their next trip to Center.

Members of the Army Domestic Action Program will be in Center the middle of May to discuss the sewer and water project for West Center as well as building a new library and other needed projects for the town.

All action was brought to a successful end. Major Reed, Marshall and Mrs. Jennie Sanchez presented a letter of appreciation to the group.

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CENTER POST DISPATCH

Center, Colorado
15 July 72

ARMY RETURNS HERE, PLANS PROGRESSING

As a result of several hours of conversation at the Town House Monday of this week, action has picked up concerning the water and sanitation lines for the area known as West Center.

Representatives of the Domestic Action Program of the Army were present for the meeting, as were several interested persons from Center, West Center and the town Planning Commission.

One of the "bones of contention" following the first meeting this year with the Army was the petition presented at the meeting calling for action on the West Center water and sanitation project before anything else was done by the Army here. At the Monday meeting, Terry Marshall, Stella Sanchez, Andrew Garcia, Ann Marshall, Jennie Sanchez and Agapito Martinez presented a letter as the principal circulators of the petition presented May 12. In this letter, the group said, "...we urge the Army and the Planning Commission to proceed immediately and simultaneously on the engineering work for sewer and water extension into West Center, expansion of the library, and

exploration of other projects which will help the community."

At the meeting, notwithstanding the letter, the Army spokesman stated they could not do any work on the library until the water and sewer project for West Center was completed. They stated also that the work was to be started no later than September of this year. The letter because the Domestic Action Program has had a setback in its endeavor which will be effective at that time.

Several persons at the meeting, including Harold Martin and Smokey Sanchez stated to the gathering that they could see no benefit to themselves for annexing to Center. Several others expressed themselves as being opposed to the idea mainly because of the manner in which they were approached by the circulator of the annexation petition. George Yaksich, chairman of the Planning Commission volunteered to talk to those people presently opposed to annexation and see if a different approach might not win their approval of the proposal.

During the course of the meeting, it was noted that the Colorado Housing, Inc., plans are progressing for them to place 50 homes in that area of Center, if annexed, and if the water and sewer was available. These 50 homes would be broken down into 30 for low income families and 20 for senior citizen housing and all would be "hooked up" to both the water and sewer facilities. The construction of these homes is not definite at this time, but plans for them.

and is still being done.

Cost of the hook up to the sewer lines has been placed at \$200. This would raise total \$8,000 and together with \$1,000 from Colorado Housing and \$21,000 from a loan, enough money, hopefully, would be in for the material involved. The Army is planning to do a rough survey this week or next to determine as closely as possible the exact cost of the plan.

Loren Ridpath, speaking for the Jaycees, told the group that his group was continuing with their work on the library. He said a hole had been knocked in the wall, forms for the cement had been layed, trees and grass cleared and the Jaycees will continue to work on this project as they can.

The Army stated that perhaps they could find some tables, chairs, etc., for the library, as well as some books, but could not use their men on it at this time.

Text of the letter from the May 12 petition circulators follows:

"Gentlemen:

"Through the efforts of Colorado Housing, Inc., the major obstacle to laying sewer and water lines into West Center has been removed. Center has within reach all the money necessary to complete the lines without undue costs either to the sanitation district or to families living in West Center.

"The goals set forth in our petition of 12 May 1942

have not been fully implemented. We believe that the construction could have started this week. However, we have seen some evidence of positive work in the city. We believe that the town can begin the construction process for the sewer and water project. We understand the Army now can provide engineering assistance for the sewer and water project.

"We fully realize that the project could still fail to materialize -- there is a chance, of course, that the Army may try to block it. We hope, though, that all animosities can be laid aside in favor of community cooperation.

"We want to re-emphasize our commitment to improvements for the entire community. We offer this letter as demonstration of our desire for all people in the community to work together -- as equals -- toward accomplishing this important sewer and water project, expansion of our library, and other projects needed for Center. We want to see all of us join together in a united effort at community improvement.

"Therefore, we urge the Army and the Planning Commission to proceed immediately and simultaneously on the engineering work for sewer and water extension into West Center, expansion of the library, and exploration of other projects which will help the community."

Gerry Marshall
Stella Sanchez
Andrew Garcia
Agapito Martinez

Ann Marshall
Jennie Sanchez

Principal circulators of the 12 May 1972 petition.

APPENDIX A

SEMI-ANNUAL DOMESTIC POLICE ACTIVITY REPORT
CONSOLIDATED NUMERICAL DATA

15 JUL 1971

COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF YOUTH PARTICIPATION REPORT

ORGANIZATION REFERENCE		REPORTING PERIOD COVERED		DATE OF REPORT	
Department of the Army		16 Sep 71 - 15 Mar 72		10 Jun 72	
PART I		CLASSES OF SUPPORT			
LINE NO.	INFORMATION	EDUCATION & TRAINING	HEALTH & MEDICAL	RECREATION	MENTAL
		PRIMARY	SUPPLEMENTARY	PRIMARY	SUPPLEMENTARY
1	NUMBER OF YOUTH SUPPORTED	166,286	51,861	166,405	32,071
2		55,696	28,089	91,836	29,765
3	TOTAL YOUTH SUPPORTED (SUM OF LINES 1-2)	221,982	79,941	278,241	61,836
4	NUMBER OF YOUTH SUPPORTED	120,087	60,979	142,856	51,861
5		29,226	19,670	98,636	32,749
6	TOTAL YOUTH SUPPORTED (SUM OF LINES 4-5)	371,295	160,629	519,140	75,718
7	NUMBER OF YOUTH PARTICIPANTS SUPPORTED (SUM OF LINES 1-3)	398,267			
8	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS SUPPORTED OTHER THAN FOR YOUTH PARTICIPATION (SUM OF LINES 4-6)	1,511,553			
9	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS SUPPORTED FOR YOUTH PARTICIPATION (SUM OF LINES 7-8)	1,909,820			
10	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS SUPPORTED FOR YOUTH PARTICIPATION (SUM OF LINES 9-10)	31,837			
11	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS SUPPORTED FOR YOUTH PARTICIPATION (SUM OF LINES 10-11)	31,837			
PART II					
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS SUPPORTED FOR YOUTH PARTICIPATION (SUM OF LINES 10-11)		31,837			

PART II

406

pages

Report 10-1

APPENDIX I

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DOMESTIC ACTION OFFICER
MAJOR CHARLES POLIUCO

1. PROBLEM. To discuss the feasibility of a program of the US Army in a large scale national domestic action program.

2. ASSUMPTIONS.

a. Following a redirection of national priorities, the Army may be tasked to administer or operate a large scale national domestic action program.

b. Provided manpower and funding were made available, both the Army and the Army Reserve has the capability to administer such a program.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

a. The Secretary of Defense decision for project "Home Run," a DOD program to give, at 6 cents on the dollar, 100 million or more dollars worth of excess Army construction equipment, being retrograded from RVN, to other government agencies to be used in solving the nation's domestic problems." This decision may involve Army support to maintain the equipment provided.

b. Development of the Intergovernment Domestic Action Conference which includes ACTION, Office of Economic Cooperation, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, DOD and other agencies is indicative of the expanding Federal role.

c. The recent CSX establishing a DA Environmental

Committee tasks the DADPA to promote and coordinate the Army's environmentally-oriented projects and activities under the Army's Domestic Action Program. To accomplish its objectives, the Committee may ultimately recommend that the Army or "currently non-Army" organizations be authorized to not only participate in a Domestic Action Program but will also attempt to specify the type program.

c. There is a precedent for the Army to assume a limited domestic involvement in a domestic problem. Some historical evidence also indicates that there is an inverse correlation between the smallness of the size of the Army and the largeness of its domestic programs. For example, the Army embarked upon the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) program in 1933 when its total strength had been reduced to 121,448 officers and men. The Army's approach to this CCC involvement will be discussed in detail in a later paragraph.

4. DISCUSSION.

a. The factors that shape both the role of the Army and its resultant image within our society are the foreign and domestic policies of each Presidential Administration and the corresponding approval or disapproval of those policies as interpreted by the Legislative Branch through the approval or withholding of appropriations.

(1) Throughout our almost two centuries of history, the US Army's interim missions have reflected the policies of each Administration which was, and is, shaped by the

April 1961, the Army's efforts to eliminate racial discrimination in its personnel programs were limited to the Army's efforts to eliminate racial discrimination in its personnel programs. The Army's efforts to eliminate racial discrimination in its personnel programs were limited to the Army's efforts to eliminate racial discrimination in its personnel programs.

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(2) A copy of the Army's efforts to eliminate racial discrimination in its personnel programs were limited to the Army's efforts to eliminate racial discrimination in its personnel programs.

units and its allocations being directed to carry out a specific effort.

(3) A new executive and/or legislative body under a non-military department of government to coordinate and control the activities of the military and non-military units.

(4) A new program with the Army being directed to operate with other departments of government providing a unified effort.

(5) The Department of the Army creation of a new program requiring separate Congressional funding and organization with Reservists as the principal operator.

d. A discussion of two past national domestic action programs and two recent proposals, along with the conclusion of "Future of the Army" study and a proposed new program as addressed in Annexes A through F as follows:

- (1) Annex "A" - History of Army's GATO Project.
- (2) Annex "B" - History of Army's GTO Project.
- (3) Annex "C" - HHC Vistula's Proposal.
- (4) Annex "D" - Mayer DiAlessandro's Proposal.
- (5) Annex "E" - Future of the Army Study.
- (6) Annex "F" - Proposed Program.

e. Factors Affecting DA Participation.

(1) The Army can ill afford to accept any program or project that is not fundamentally acceptable to the social economic viewpoints of the majority of the American people. Any program that is not in complete sympathy with

[illegible]

(3) Today other departments of the Federal Government want all the missions and programs they can get because they, like the Army, are continually under Congressional scrutiny to eliminate personnel excess, trim their budgets or develop new programs to justify present and proposed appropriations.

(c) Any significant increase in domestic action programs by the Active Army, such as assuming the responsibility for a Job Corps-type project of the national level of the old GOC program, would enlarge the span of control of the Active Army at a critical time and reduce the amount of effort available for Department of the Army leaders to

(3) The Job Group was primarily composed of 10-14 yrs. With only a few exceptions, all divisions were represented and one of the Job Groups was found to be very appropriate.

...the lack of discipline and improper conduct of the personnel, will ultimately lead to the pre-emptive termination, administration and management of future programs of this nature by the US Army similar to the present situation.

(4) The occurrence of a large scale 600-type effort by the Active Army would severely offend the civilian population. The former Secretary of the Interior, William H. Hickel, recommended that the civil functions of the Corps of Engineers be placed under the Department of the Interior. Secretary Hickel believed that putting all civil works under his Department would facilitate a coordinated approach to protecting the nation's natural environment. The transfer of the Corps of Engineers had been previously proposed. Several Interior Secretaries over the past years have made similar proposals. The successful direct employment of Active Army units, particularly engineer units, in a 600-type effort would lend further support to those who want civilian control of the Army Corps of Engineers transferred to another non-military Federal agency in place of the

recent requirements for coordination of military and civil control measures at the executive level by the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency and the creation of political agencies in close link to the civilian government. It is now clear that the civilian functions of the Army Engineer Corps could be transferred to the Interior Department or some other department in the near future, particularly if the Army were to let its guard down by losing Army direct participation in a large scale domestic security effort, thereby proving the feasibility, if not the wisdom, of such a transfer. Those who disregard the possibility of the transfer of peacetime engineer functions to a non-military agency should be reminded of the recent fate of the United States Coast Guard. An objective evaluation will reveal that a stronger case can be made for the transfer of the Army Transportation Corps to the Department of Transportation than was made for the transfer of the US Coast Guard.

(5) Two of our nation's more obvious domestic problems are ecology and unemployment. The unemployment problem is twofold: one, by geographic area partly as the result of the closing of defense installations and partly as the result of changing migrant patterns; and two, by social-economic group. The group unemployment is characterized by young people in the 16-24 year age group with low, marginal or sub-standard educational and vocational qualifications. This group of young men are often identified

es the high level of expenditures are not sufficiently commensurate with the mutual problems of peacetime adjustment and the need for adequate social adjustments. The July 1972 national unemployment rates for all males are the following: age 16-17 - 18.6%, age 18-19 - 16.0%, age 20-24 - 10.1%, age 25-34 - only 4.4%. The national unemployment rates for these same age groups for non-whites are as follows: age 16-17 - 33.4%, age 18-19 - 26.0%, age 20-24 - 16.2%. Clearly the nation's major unemployment problem is made youth in the 16-24 age group.

5. CONCLUSION.

a. During a sustained peacetime environment, the continued large expenditure of tax monies on wartime requirements forces both the politician and the soldier to suggest and present visible additional or alternative uses of expensive military resources.

b. Because of past success in administering large domestic action programs, e.g., the CCC, the recent failure of national programs operated by other Federal agencies, e.g., the Job Corps of the Department of Labor, the Army will again be tasked to be the administrator of a national domestic action program.

c. A review of Army participation in past national domestic action programs and anticipated future funding and strength limitations supports the contention that it would not be in the best interest of the Active Army to assume the primary role in a new program and that any new program

and to be separately funded and administered by the Army Reserve with staff supervision and maximum utilization of support being provided by the Active Army.

The present approach to the solution of the domestic problem is not in keeping with the fundamental military principles of "Objective" and "Concentration of Force." The Army image could be improved most if it were to target all of its resources and energies towards the solution of one major national problem.

e. A national program that would receive the maximum support from both Congress and the civilian sector would attempt to solve one or more environmental problems by providing marketable vocational skills and remedial education training to unemployed youth in the 16-24 year age group.

f. If provided separate appropriations, man day support, and the opportunity to participate in the development of the program, the US Army Reserve would accept the mission to administer a future national domestic action program as it did in the past.

g. Any program that assists male youth in the 16-24 year age group to acquire a useful skill and find gainful employment through improved vocational and educational training also ultimately serves the Army by way of providing potentially qualified future enlistments and an improved mobilization base.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. It is recommended that the Active Army and the Army Reserve jointly develop a plan for a national educational action program with the US Army Reserve acting in an operative role and the Active Army the supportive and supervisory role in its execution.

b. It is further recommended that the parameters for development of the program be:

(1) A proposed solution to one or two major national environmental problems.

(2) to provide for the acquisition of marketable vocational skills and remedial educational training for employed youth in the 16-24 year age group.

(3) A requirement for separate funding.

(4) A provision for maximum utilization of the skills of both unit and IRR personnel in a non-active duty status in addition to the active duty personnel requirement.

(5) To allow for the inclusion of any future "B" Board (Quantity) RIF personnel to receive priority of assignment as full-time cadre for the program.

APPENDIX A.

THE WORK OF THE CIVILIAN MILITARY
TRAINING CAMP EFFORT

1. In addition to such historical social roles as building of roads, trails, canals, and railroads, and during the period between the Civil War and World War I, one of the Army's more contemporary large scale national domestic action programs was begun in 1921 as a result of the National Defense Act of 1920. At that time, the Army undertook a national training program called the Civilian Military Training Camp (CMTC). The Army established, as it did later in the CCC project, training camps for youth. These camps were described by many as military in character. In the early 1920's, the general public reception to the CMTC program was favorable, and the then Secretary of War concluded that it was "without question the most popular activity with which the War Department has to deal." It must be remembered that this was only a few years after the end of World War I, a vastly popular war in the annals of Army history resulting in considerable pro-Army support during that post-war period.

2. Criticism of the CMTC ranged from the views of one writer who found it "the most subtle of all the engines

with which General Leonard Wood was finally able to convert the U.S. to militarism." as a vaguer disapproval of the program as one which attempted to indoctrinate American youth with a psychology of militarism.

3. Even in the 1920's much concern was expressed over the OCMC's influence on the Army's mission because of the program's imposition on the personnel of the Regular Army to run the camps. Later, the political administration relieved this situation of Army support by turning over the camps to units of the new Organized Reserves, who could benefit from the opportunity of leadership and instruction by administering the camps.

ANNEX "B"

HISTORY OF ARMY

CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS INVOLVEMENT

1. The most familiar large scale social role for the Army was the operation of the Civilian Conservation Corps of the 1930's. The primary objectives of the CCC were to give jobs to discouraged and undernourished young men, to build up these men physically and spiritually, and to start the nation on a good conservation program. The CCC was in fact one of our nation's earliest so called "wars on poverty."
2. To operate the CCC, the Army ultimately relied heavily on Reserve officers to administer the camps. At one point in 1935, over 6,000 Reserve officers were on CCC duty. For reasons discussed throughout this study, every class of the C&GSC and AWC generates at least one thesis proposing that the Army develop a new CCC-type program to solve all the nation's domestic ills. It is stressed that the past success of the CCC could be, and perhaps is, anachronous today. What was relatively successful in the 1930's may not necessarily be successful in the 1970's.
3. The CCC's responsibilities were for the Department of Labor to select the men; the Department of Agriculture and Interior to select and supervise the projects; and for the

any enrollment, training, and employment needs and discipline of the men as well as the maintenance and operation of the camps.

4. The education and training for the CCC in 1934 was for men ages 18-24 years old. One prerequisite of training and that of most all men was, required compulsory education until age 14 regardless of the grade level achieved by that time. Today our major youth unemployment problems are not as applicable to the 16-24 year olds. The major problem today is that group in the transitional age period from the time of initial school completion or dropout to the time of acceptance of some form of full-time meaningful employment. Today the hard core of the unemployment problem is the 16-17 year old males, then the 18-19 year olds, and finally, the 20 year olds and above group.

5. Similar to many of the current proposals, the original CCC enrollee selection was primarily from those individuals whose families were on public relief, presently better known as welfare. At that time the CCC selectees volunteered to allot \$22-\$25 of their \$30 monthly wage to their dependents, which were usually their parents. This represented about 73% to 83% of their total pay. The 1972 dollar equivalent of \$30 in 1934 is slightly less than \$100. It is questionable how many young men in today's socio-economic environment would voluntarily participate in a CCC-type program for \$100 a month when they can receive anywhere from a low of \$135 to a high of \$425 a

men a unemployment compensation for an average of six months duration. It is also highly probable that many young men today would volunteer to allow 10% to 15% of their wages to be deducted for such costs.

6. When the CCC was being organized, General Douglas MacArthur, foresaw the further reduction of the Army's manpower and funds. To preserve the Army's mission capability, he insisted on the CCC being staffed by Reserve officers in lieu of Regulars. Many interesting similarities can be drawn from the policies confronting the Army appropriation and strength positions in the 1930's and in that which is anticipated for the 1970's.

7. Funds for the CCC program were appropriated separately. This is an extremely important point for the Army to remember in considering any future undertakings in this area. The CCC operating cost in 1934 dollars was \$1,004 per enrollee. A total of 3 million men eventually processed through the system during an eight-or nine-year period at a total cost of approximately 3 billion dollars. One thousand and four dollars in 1934 dollars would equal \$3,139 in 1972 dollars, but it is highly doubtful that a dollar-for-dollar cost comparison can or should be made.

8. Another important element of the CCC was its training. President Roosevelt approved a rationed directed education service for the CCC program. The records indicate that the Army initially fought the educational program.

development of a plan of action for the rural areas of the country. It is necessary to have a program of educational work in the rural areas to educate the people and to have a program of research and development in the rural areas. That was all in the years 1933-34. The program of research and development was a part of the rural development program. The program of research and development was a part of the rural development program. The program of research and development was a part of the rural development program.

9. When the numerous CCC-type projects are suggested to the country, it must be observed that they are rural.

original - rural in nature. The original projects were:

- (a) Forest protection and improvement.
- (b) Re-pressing grazing land.
- (c) Construction of dams, trails, bridges.
- (d) Soil conservation.
- (e) Wildlife conservation.
- (f) Improvement of national and state park facilities.
- (g) Flood control.

10. In 1933 the CCC was supervised by the mission-oriented Department of the Interior's Forestry Service and the Department of Agriculture. Both of these departments were, and still are, rurally-oriented by their very nature.

Because of the urban nature of our nation's domestic problems, in the 1970's perhaps the missions for any new program should be with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare; the Housing and Urban Development Agency; or similar agencies.

11. Sometime during the middle of World War II, American

...and the Army's ability to support an urban view-
vis rural program. This is a point to remember in considering any new GSO-type projects.
In 1955 the GSO and its projects, being mostly-urban, were
more or less Americanized correctly enough. In 1955 the
sending urban youth to rural areas to engage in rural-
oriented projects may not be the best way to engage in
job opportunities. It would be more sensible to send
rural youth to urban areas to engage in urban-oriented pro-
jects because today the migration pattern of our population
is still from rural to urban. In considering urban view-
vis rural programs, another area of visual consideration is
the Army's geographical ability to support an urban view-
vis rural-type program. Most large Army posts, camps and
stations are located in non-urban areas. With the ex-
ceptions of Fort Dix, New Jersey; Fort Devens, Massachusetts;
and Fort Lewis, Washington; and perhaps Fort Ord, California,
all large troop concentrations are south of the Mason-Dixon line.
Reserve Component units are locat-
ed more where the people are, e.g., the Army Reserve in
larger and medium-size cities and the National Guard in
small towns and medium-size cities.

12. Through the years, the GSO has enjoyed a considerable

13. When legislation was finally introduced to try to make the CCC a permanent organization, the Army then took an opposite position contending that the program could not be run entirely by a civilian agency. Even with the advent of World War II, when the military started to expand, in 1939-1941, the Army leadership refused to incorporate elements of military training into the CCC camp. This in itself reflects the great sensitivity of the Army to public criticism during that period. The Army was particularly sensitive to criticism and charges of military mismanagement and would expect even the most charges and criticisms in the 1940's.

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1. THE PROPOSAL

THE VETERAN PROPOSAL

1. On 30 June 1970, LTC Vistrup (Ret.), one-time Chief of Legislative Liaison and Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, met with the OGA, General Macmillan, regarding the receptiveness of the Army to assume a new CCC-type program.
2. It was suggested at that time that the nation has large economic, social, and conservation problems. The nation did have a recession with resulting high unemployment. LTC Vistrup proposed the creation and use of reclamation engineer units, i.e., units traditionally associated with "strong backs and weak minds," to assist in alleviating these national problems. There is, of course, nothing new in that type proposal; several nations have restructured their entire armed forces along these proposed lines, the most recent, or more publicized, being the army of the Philippines.
3. The proposed use of reclamation engineers was to construct forest firebreaks, reclaim strip mining areas, and to clean waterways, rivers and canals. LTC Vistrup's proposal, and many other proposals, are of the CCC-type proposal, i.e., a renewal of the Civilian Conservation Corps concept. It must be stressed that today America

to the small number of people who are interested in the
the six persons of the population who are interested in
them, most of the major economic problems and likewise
education and the other all kinds of other problems
are the small-scale problems. Perhaps this is be-
cause the old type of people are not interested in
it, but also perhaps it is because the small-type pro-
jects offer a better and more visible opportunity of
the urban projects.

PROPOSED PROGRAM

1. A proposed solution to the social problem of environmental pollution is a military program consisting of a concerted nationwide effort by the Department of the Army using the organizational structure of the Army Reserve. The program would be a military-reserved approach toward improving our environment and providing vocational and educational rehabilitation training to unemployed youth. One part of the effort should be rural-orientated towards such projects as rivers, streams, and national forests; the other part oriented towards urban problems such as the cleaning up and improvement of city parks, playgrounds, streets and alleys. Such a double-edged project would, on the one hand, attempt to solve some of our nation's vast environmental problems, both rural and urban, and simultaneously provide some degree of opportunity for physical, educational and vocational rehabilitation to a large number of disadvantaged youth in the high unemployment (16-24 year old) age group.

2. The US Army Reserve has the largest resource of personnel talent in the United States. Its members possess all civilian professions, trades and occupations, as well as all military occupational specialties. These personnel assets include such skills as: social workers, remedial education teachers, heavy equipment operators, mechanics, lawyers. The Army Reserve has all the human resources

necessary to conduct a large scale program of this type.

3. The problem of a reduction of strength levels of troops in large national domestic operations is a complex one. It involves managers and leaders, and the Army, Navy, and Air Force. It is also a problem of the future. It is not clear that any future national mobilization program will again be placed under the operational control of the Army. It is with the Active Army assuming a supportive and supervisory role.

4. Possible strength level limitations of the Active Army and reduced military operation costs will be increasingly important considerations in the immediate future. The proposed use of Reserve personnel to operate a large scale program would both prevent an increase in active duty strength levels, would not affect the Officers Grade Limitation Act (OGILA), and would also assist in conserving limited appropriations. Funding for a Reserve operation program could be programmed on a man day basis. If, for example, a Chaplain were needed, he could be placed on active duty training for a required period only, i.e., Sundays, resulting in only expending eight days pay per month in lieu of 30 days, plus rations and quarters, for an active duty Chaplain.

5. A separately funded program administered by the Army Reserve would benefit the:

a. Active Army by:

(1) Reducing the probability of the Army receiving a domestic action mission and subsequently receiving reduced appropriations and manning levels without a corresponding reduction in the newly acquired mission.

(2) Reducing the probability of the Army losing operational control of civil function organizations in peacetime, e.g., Corps of Engineers, to other Federal agencies.

(3) Reducing the effect of possible future charges of militarism.

(4) Preventing a loss of mission capability and readiness, yet providing the same opportunity for all installations and organizations to provide on a voluntary basis as much personnel and material support to the program as they would be capable of.

b. Army Reserve by:

(1) Providing an opportunity to develop a detailed national program employing the full range of military and civilian talents possessed by unit, mobilization designation and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) personnel on a combined full-time and part-time active duty basis.

(2) Providing a new vehicle to employ the often dormant talents of IRR personnel in a program having a high degree of appeal to a large segment of those members.

(3) Providing all TO&E units with additional missions that would serve as an opportunity to display their planning, organizational and leadership abilities.

(4) Enhancing their image within the civilian

community as a result of their contribution toward improving the environment and reducing unemployment and welfare costs.

(5) Enhancing their image within the Active Army by providing a vehicle to display their vast military and civilian skills and organizational ability.

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